The Image of Emiliano Zapata in the United States 1911-1988 by Tate, Deborah Gronich
W&M ScholarWorks 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
1989 
The Image of Emiliano Zapata in the United States 1911-1988 
Deborah Gronich Tate 
College of William & Mary - Arts & Sciences 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/etd 
 Part of the International Relations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Tate, Deborah Gronich, "The Image of Emiliano Zapata in the United States 1911-1988" (1989). 
Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects. Paper 1539625543. 
https://dx.doi.org/doi:10.21220/s2-fp4e-rh41 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at W&M 
ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations, Theses, and Masters Projects by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
THE IMAGE OF EMILIANO ZAPATA IN THE UNITED STATES
1911-1988
A Thesis
Presented to 
The Faculty of the Department of History 
The College of William and Mary in Virginia
In Partial Fulfillment 
Of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Arts
by
Deborah Gronich Tate 
1989
APPROVAL SHEET
This thesis is submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts 
/Author
Approved, August 1989
Judith Ewell
A-AaAu
Philira Funigiell.
For these considerations we declare the aforementioned 
Francisco I. Madero inept at realizing the promises of the 
revolution of which he was the author, because he has 
betrayed the principles with which he tricked the will of 
the people and was able to get into power: incapable of
governing, because he has no respect for the law and justice 
of the pueblos, and a traitor to the fatherland, because he 
is humiliating in blood and fire Mexicans who want 
liberties, so as to please the cientificos, landlords, and 
bosses who enslave us, and from today on we begin to 
continue the revolution begun by him, until we achieve the 
overthrow of the dictatorial powers which exist.
Plan de Ayala
Men of the South: It is better to die on your feet than to
live on your knees.
Emiliano Zapata
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ABSTRACT
Emiliano Zapata is today a truly legendary figure. His 
myth in the United States has been over seventy five years 
in the making. It continues to be an inspiration to rebels 
and revolutionaries, not only in Latin America, but in the 
U.S. as well. In 1976, for example, a group calling 
themselves the "Emiliano Zapata Unit" blew up the San 
Francisco branch of the Bank of America.
This thesis traces the building of the Zapata legend in 
the United States. The process has been both unconscious 
and explicit as Zapata's actions, goals, and significance 
were explored in books, news stories, diplomatic dispatches, 
memoirs, music, novels, and film.
Those on both the right and left of the U.S. political 
spectrum have attempted to reinvent Zapata as a symbol of 
their beliefs. Taking Zapata out of context, however, 
neither side grasped the essential element of Zapatlsmo, its 
localist motivations and scope. In the end, whether it was 
a filmmaker trying to create a peasant cold warrior or a 
scholar searching for Ho Chi Minh's ideological forefather, 
Zapata refused to serve any man's purposes but his own.
v
THE IMAGE OF EMILIANO ZAPATA IN THE UNITED STATES
1911-1988
INTRODUCTION
Through the twentieth century Emiliano Zapata's
reputation has gone through dramatic changes. He has been
labelled bandit, Robin Hood, social revolutionary, agrarian
reformer, localist, nationalist, anarchist, communist. He
has been underestimated and overrated and ignored entirely.
Many in the U.S. have contributed their version of the
nature of Zapata's life and career. There are as many
Zapatas as there are people to tell his tale: journalists,
diplomats, ex-patriots, intellectuals, scholars, novelists,
filmmakers, and musicians.
In The Aztec Image in Western Thought, Benjamin Keen
described a characteristic of the studies of Aztec
civilization that also holds true for the work on Zapata:
The extreme diversity of views expressed by writers who 
drew upon much the same body of facts, and the passion 
they displayed, arose not only from the inherently 
controversial nature of the subject but from the 
premises and partialities they themselves brought to 
the subject. Inevitably, in debating the nature of 
Aztec society men debate contemporary issues— economic, 
social, and ideological.1
The image of Zapata has been involved in this century's
debate over the proper role of the U.S. in Latin America,
1 Benjamin Keen, The Aztec Image In Western Thought 
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press,
1971), 564.
2
3and by extension, in the rest of the world. Within this 
larger question, portraits of Zapata have been used to 
support positions on race relations, fascism, communism, 
capitalism, United States presidential politics, and other 
issues that guide United States foreign relations.
The early twentieth century was the heyday of United 
States "big stick" policy and gunboat diplomacy in Latin 
America. Among other adventures, the U.S. had "detached" 
Panama from Colombia and secured the treaty for the canal. 
Cuba was living under the Platt Amendment and Mexico, Haiti, 
the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua endured occupations of 
various lengths by the U.S. marines. These policies were a 
product of the notions of the "white man's burden" and the 
rejection of earlier Romantic ideas of the "noble savage" 
and the greatness of the Incan and Aztec civilizations whose 
descendants currently peopled Latin America. As the century 
progressed there were, of course, those who opposed gunboat 
diplomacy and the racism that supported it. These were 
reform-minded people, like Ernest Gruening who wrote for the 
Nation and worked on the presidential campaign of 
Progressive Robert LaFollette. What is interesting about 
the writing on Emiliano Zapata by members of these two camps 
is that they both came to negative conclusions about Zapata, 
although for very different reasons.
As World War II approached, many in the U.S. began to 
see Latin America less as a treasure trove to be mined by
4those of superior race and intellect, and more as an exposed 
flank. First frightening ideologies, then even more 
frightening armies, came out of Europe and they could 
infiltrate the U.S. by way of Latin America if we were not 
watchful. At this time Zapata's U.S. reputation underwent a 
dramatic rehabilitation as those who wrote about Zapata did 
all they could to enlist him on the side of truth, justice, 
and the "American" way. The U.S. government, press, and 
several authors turned their best efforts to recreating 
Zapata as a symbol of the fight between democracy and 
dictatorship. Ultimately, this role as a supporter of U.S.- 
style democracy against the fascist and communist hordes fit 
Zapata no better than the role of bandit chief. Zapata, 
unlike Francisco Madero, believed that "the people want 
bread, not democracy."
Through the 1960s and 197 0s, as U.S. and European 
empires crumbled*and "peoples' revolutions" fought and 
sometimes won, the U.S. took a new interest in these types 
of movements, especially as they affected our role in Latin 
America. Did they have a historical precedent? Was 
violence a legitimate way to gain social justice? For the 
first time, trained professional historians joined in the 
study of Zapata as a way to explore these issues. John 
Womack proved beyond a doubt that Zapata was no Jeffersonian 
yeoman farmer fighting for an abstract concept of democracy. 
Womack's work led many who opposed the U.S. role as world
5policeman to adopt Zapata as a symbol for their particular 
banners. For example, in San Francisco in 1976, a group 
within the New World Liberation Front, a terrorist 
organization fighting for "a Socialist revolution in order 
to serve the interest of poor people,"2 named themselves the 
Emiliano Zapata Unit and bombed four Bay Area Safeway 
grocery stores, demanding that Safeway cut its prices by 
25%.3 Before their arrest on charges of possession of 
unregistered destructive devices, the Unit also bombed the 
community "parasites" at the San Francisco branch of Bank of 
America.4 When they discovered that the blast had broken 
windows in the homes of some low-income families nearby, the 
Unit sent $7 5 in money orders to repair the damage.5
By the late 197 0s, the setbacks and repression of 
revolutionary movements such as the Cultural Revolution in 
China and the restyling of the Cuban revolution on the 
Soviet model, had led to disillusionment with the 
revolutionaries of the 1960s. In the U.S. a more 
romanticized, heroic recreation of Zapata surfaced. So far, 
however, this new image has met with little encouragement or 
approval. In 1981, for example, the San Diego Opera
2 Los Angeles Times, 8 February 1975.
3 Los Angeles Times, 4 January 1976.
4 New York Times, 2 0 January 1976.
5 Ibid.
6commissioned an work based on the life of Zapata to 
commemorate the company's twentieth anniversary. The 
composer, Leonardo Balada, has characterized the Zapata of 
this opera as a social revolutionary and a tragic hero.6 
Zapata, however, has yet to be performed in its entirety. 
Although the opera was finished, the performance "never got 
beyond the planning stages" in San Diego.7 When the 
librettist, Tito Capobianco, became General Director of the 
Pittsburgh Opera he tried to stage Zapata there, but lack of 
funding and a feeling that "the subject matter is not as 
appropriate for members of the Pittsburgh community as it 
would have been for the San Diego community" have kept the 
opera waiting in the wings.8 In the U.S., only the music 
from the "Wedding Dance" of the opera has been performed, 
appearing on the program of American Music Week at the 
National Symphony Orchestra in November 1985. The reviewer 
for the Washington Post found the piece "wild, <and> rather 
disjointed."9
6 Leonardo Balada to the author, 9 May 1988.
7 Lizbeth Persons, Marketing and P.R. Assistant, San 
Diego Opera, to the author, 7 March 1988.
8 Catherine Wolff, assistant to the General Director, 
Pittsburgh Opera, to the author, 11 April 1988.
9 Joseph McLellan, review of "Wedding Dance," by 
Leonardo Balada (National Symphony Orchestra, Washington, 
D.C.), Washington Post, 8 November 1985.
7Until the debate over the U.S. role in Latin America, 
and the world, flares up again, Zapata will probably remain 
on the cultural and political back burner in the U.S. His 
struggle, his methods, and his goals were almost entirely 
outside the U.S. context. Since 1911, Zapata has been 
periodically recreated as a symbol of the ideological agenda 
of one U.S. group or another, undergoing gross distortion in 
the process. With these exceptions, however, Zapata has 
been, and will probably remain, an alien figure to the U.S. 
mind.
CHAPTER I
THE NOTORIOUS CHIEFTAIN
The United States government had approved of the 
dictatorial Porfiriato, those years from 1876 to 1910, when 
President Porfirio Diaz had created "Order and Progress" in 
Mexico with his policy of pan o palo. Diaz had welcomed 
U.S. investment with open arms and investors found there was 
much money to be made. Never looking below the surface at 
prosperity's cost to the average Mexican, the U.S. applauded 
the "miracle" Diaz had wrought in the previously chaotic 
Mexico. By 1908, however, Diaz was an old man. He gave an 
interview to U.S. correspondent James Creelman in which he 
said he would not run in the presidential election of 1910. 
Francisco I. Madero, an idealistic wealthy hacendado from 
Coahuila, took the President at his word. In 1910, Diaz ran 
after all and defeated Madero in an extremely questionable 
election. Madero led a revolt against Diaz and defeated him 
in battle at the key border town of Ciudad Juarez in 1911. 
With the Treaty of Ciudad Juarez in May, Diaz and Vice- 
President Ramon Corral resigned and Secretary of Foreign 
Relations Francisco Leon de la Barra became the provisional 
president, pending new elections in October.
8
9The Zapatistas of Morelos had supported Madero based on 
Madero1s promise of agrarian reform in his Plan de San Luis 
Potosi. These campesinos had been losing their land to the 
quasi-legal maneuverings of the local hacendados throughout 
the Porfiriato. Now that the Revolution was won, however, 
Madero filled the government with men from the Diaz regime 
and backed off immediate action on his agrarian promises, 
saying the government needed to study the problem. In 
addition, he asked the Zapatistas to lay down their arms. 
Zapata actually had begun to comply when in August 1911, 
Provisional President de la Barra sent General Victoriano 
Huerta to Morelos to "subdue11 the Zapatistas. Zapata felt 
completely betrayed by Madero, who so quickly had been 
coopted by the Porfirian cientificos, bureaucrats, and his 
fellow hacendados, and led the Zapatistas in revolt against 
the government.
Those in charge of the United States1 Mexican policy at 
the time of the 1911 Zapatista revolt were squarely on the 
side of "dollar diplomacy." They believed that the U.S. had 
a right to intervene in Latin America on behalf of U.S. 
investors. President Taft's Secretary of State Philander C. 
Knox had spent many years practicing corporate law, and the 
Dictionary of American Biography records that, "In the 
conduct of foreign relations one of Knox's chief policies 
was the encouragement and protection of American investments
10
10 • abroad . . . "  The U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane
Wilson, was also "a vigorous defender of American
interests."11 The Secretary, the Ambassador, and other U.S.
diplomats, evaluated Zapata based on his likely effect on
U.S. holdings in Mexico. Charge d*Affaires Fred Morris
Dearing sent Secretary Knox a telegram from Mexico City in
August 1911 describing Zapata as:
. . . a self-instituted revolutionary chief, whose
following consists of several thousand outlaws, 
criminals, and other undesirables . . . his purpose, if 
he can be said to have one, seeming to be to establish 
a band of outlaws such as existed in Morelos and 
Guerrero from 184 0-187 0, to prey upon the people and 
property of those states and to force his election as 
governor of Morelos at the next election.12
Dearing thought highly of the interim government of
Francisco Leon de la Barra, Porfirio Diaz's former Secretary
of Foreign Relations, and communicated this regularly to
Secretary Knox. Dearing felt confident that the Provisional
President "would swiftly wind up the present difficulties"13
10 * 9 9 9Dictionary of American Biography, 1933 ed., s.v.
"Knox."
11 Dictionary of American Biography, 1933 ed., s.v. 
"Wilson."
12 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1911, (Washington, 1918), 
513 .
13 Gene Z. Hanrahan, ed. , Documents of the Mexican 
Revolution (Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 
1976), vol. 3, The Election of Madero,, the Rise of Emiliano 
Zapata and the Reyes Plot in Texas, 48.
11
with Zapata and bring "peace and normal conditions"14 back 
to Mexico. "Normal" conditions, of course, meant security 
for U.S. investments in Mexico, which in 1911, totalled 
$646.2 million.15
Ambassador Wilson shared Dearing*s sentiments on 
Zapata. Wilson felt that Mexicans needed to be ruled with 
an iron hand. In his dispatches, Wilson never considered 
that Zapata may have had a legitimate grievance against the 
government. Zapata was simply the "notorious chieftain,
. . . one of the malcontent and depredatory elements."16
The telegrams between Ambassador Wilson and Secretary 
Knox in May of 1912, illustrate the official Taft 
administration attitudes toward Zapata. On May 24, Wilson 
informed Knox that Zapata had sent a letter to the U.S. 
Consul General warning all Americans to leave Mexico City 
because Zapata was about to attack. The Ambassador asked 
Knox for guidance.17 The next day Knox replied that plans 
should be made for gathering members of the American colony
14 Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1911, 513.
15 Josefina Zoraida Vazquez and Lorenzo Meyer, The 
United States and Mexico, The United States in the World: 
Foreign Perspectives Series, ed. Akira Iriye (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1985), 97.
16 Department of State, Foreign Relations, 1911, 518-
519.
17 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1912 (Washington, 1919) , 
811.
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in a safe place if necessary, but that the Consul General
• t 18 tdefinitely should not send a reply to Zapata. Wilson 
wrote back that same day saying no one was very worried 
since "it is believed his <Zapata's> forces are 
insufficiently armed to undertake a considerable 
movement."19 Officially the United States government's only 
concern with Zapata was the minor threat he posed to the 
lives and property of the American Colony. Taft 
administration diplomats may have been unhappy with Madero's 
revolution, but it was because they wanted Diaz back, or at 
least wanted Madero to bring back Diaz's "Order and 
Progress."
In the first half of 1913, events occurred which
brought changes in the official U.S. position on Zapata.
Throughout 1912, Ambassador Wilson became increasingly
frustrated with President Madero, as Madero did not feel:
. . . compelled by the force of circumstances <the
continued Zapatista rebellion, among others> to more 
and more revert to the system implanted by General 
Diaz, thus paying mute and tardy but eloquent tribute 
to the wisdom of his great predecessor."
From 9 February 1913, to February 18, a period known as the
"Ten Tragic Days," Generals Bernardo Reyes, Felix Diaz
(nephew to Porfirio), and Victoriano Huerta led a coup which
18 Ibid. , 812.
19 Ibid.
20 Hanrahan, Documents, 297.
13
resulted in many civilian deaths and the assassination of 
President Madero. Ambassador Wilson played a shamefully 
active role, consulting with the plotters. On February 18, 
Wilson, Huerta, and Diaz met at the U.S. embassy and 
hammered out the details of the plan, known as the Pact of 
the Embassy, by which President Madero and Vice President 
Pino Suarez would be arrested and Huerta would become the 
provisional president. The plan was carried out the next 
day. On February 21, as Madero and Suarez were being 
transferred to the penitentiary, they were "shot while 
trying to escape."21
One month later though, Woodrow Wilson took office as 
President of the United States. His moralistic approach to 
foreign policy necessitated new diplomats and new diplomacy. 
William Jennings Bryan, an opponent of "dollar diplomacy," 
replaced P.C. Knox as Secretary of State on 5 March 1913. 
Henry Lane Wilson was asked to tender his resignation, since 
the new President considered him, "a moral accomplice to the 
violent overthrow of a constitutional regime and to the 
assassination of its leaders."22 Fred Dearing gave way as 
charge d'affaires to Nelson O'Shaughnessy, an astute, 
efficient, aristocratic, and conservative professional
21 Michael C. Meyer and William L. Sherman, The Course 
of Mexican History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) ,
520-521.
22 Zoraida and Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 110.
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diplomat.23 Most importantly, President Wilson refused to 
recognize Huerta’s government. Instead, the administration 
chose to contact Zapata and other anti-government leaders 
through a few letters and through agents sent to Mexico to 
gather information. In July, 0 1Shaughnessy passed on to 
Washington a letter from Zapata to Wilson, thanking the 
President for refusing to recognize Huerta’s government.
0*Shaughnessy expressed his belief that the letter was 
authentic, which was the first slightly positive word about 
Zapata ever forwarded to Washington.24
In August, President Wilson sent Minnesotan John Lind 
to Mexico as his personal representative. Lind, who spoke 
no Spanish and knew nothing about Mexico,25 sent back his 
observations on Zapata, whom he never personally met. In 
Lind's opinion, "It is absolutely futile to hope for orderly 
government at the hands of the Mexicans of the South."26 
Holding many of the common racial views of U.S. whites of 
his day, Lind believed that the "backwardness of the 
Southern Indians was comparable to that of the Negroes in
23 Dictionary of American Biography, 1933 ed. , s.v. 
"Nelson 0'Shaughnessy."
24 This is based on my survey of Papers Relating to the 
Foreign Relations of the United States for the years 19lb-
1919.
25 Larry D. Hill, Emissaries to a Revolution (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1973), 64.
26 Ibid., 127.
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the Southern United States" and favored U.S. support of the 
northern Mexican rebels (Francisco Villa or Venustiano 
Carranza) against Huerta since the former must have advanced 
politically by their geographical proximity to superior U.S. 
institutions and ideas.27
In the spring of 1914, Hubert L. Hall, an American 
resident of Mexico, began haunting the corridors of the 
State Department. Born in New England, Hall had been a 
resident of Morelos since 1892. He had lost his investment 
in a Cuernavaca hotel and timber land near Santa Maria 
during the Zapatista revolt in 1911, and his attempts to 
start a colonizing company in Morelos failed in the 
upheavals after the 1913 Huerta coup. In the spring of 
1914, a Mexican named Jacobo Ramos Martinez approached Hall 
with faked Zapatista credentials and said he was empowered 
to negotiate for arms and supplies. He convinced Hall to 
speak to John Lind at Veracruz and then follow Lind back to 
Washington. While in D.C. Hall filed with the State 
Department many favorable reports on the Zapatistas, which 
the State Department largely ignored because they were 
preoccupied with the April invasion of Veracruz. In 
September Secretary Bryan sent Hall to Mexico to meet 
personally, but unofficially, with Zapata in the hopes that 
Carranza and Zapata could unite their forces and bring an
27 Ibid., 127-128.
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end to the Huerta government. Bryan was probably hesitant 
to give Hall full credentials because of Hall's connection 
with the suspicious Ramos Martinez. Hall was almost 
certainly motivated to undertake this mission by his desire 
to gain the goodwill of Zapata in order to further his
scheme for a new colonizing company in Morelos, The
• • • 28 •Liberating Army Cooperative Colony. Hall's mission was
complicated by "First Chief" Carranza's desire to deal with 
Zapata without U.S. interference and the attempts of Ramos 
Martinez to use Hall to extort money from the U.S. 
government under the guise of securing Zapatista supplies.
In January of 1915, Hall went into Morelos and tried to drum 
up subscribers for the cooperative and convince Palafox to 
grant him the land as a concession. Hall continued to 
report favorably on Zapata and conditions in Morelos to the 
U.S. government. Later, during the Convention of 
Aguascalientes, Hall wrote letters glorifying the 
Zapatistas, stressing their "revolutionary virtue" in 
refusing to back down on their principles. All of this did 
the Zapatistas little good, however, since Hall discredited 
himself by his association with Ramos Martinez and by 
pretending to the Zapatistas to be a credentialed 
representative of the U.S. government, which Secretary Bryan
28 John Womack, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969? Vintage Books, 1970),
237.
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discovered when a suspicious Manuel Palafox, one of Zapata*s 
top aides, inquired about Hall's status. After April 1915, 
Hall played no further role in the relations between the 
Wilson administration and the Zapatistas.29
The final blow to Zapatista credibility with the U.S. 
government came from the report of Duval West, a San Antonio 
lawyer who was the last of President Wilson's 
representatives to the Zapatistas. West visited Zapata in 
Morelos for one day in April 1915, during the height of 
Zapata's land reform program. Carranza had his hands full 
pursuing Villa, so the Zapatistas, under the nub of the 
Convention government in Cuernavaca, were steadily 
accomplishing the division of the land they had fought for 
over five long years.30 West did not approve, and reported 
that Zapata "believes that it is perfectly right that the 
property of the rich shall be taken and given to the 
poor."31 West also brought back the news that Zapata wanted 
to send a commission to Wilson "with a view to secure 
recognition from the United States."32 Wilson refused to 
see such a commission, but said he was willing to look over
29 Ibid. , 239.
30 For details see Womack, chapter 8, "The Pueblos Carry 
Out a Revolution."
31 Hill, Emissaries, 324.
32 Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1915, (Washington, 1924), 
688.
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any documents Zapata sent him. Wilson actually received a 
copy of the Plan de Ayala, but there is no evidence to 
suggest that either he or the Secretary of State took it 
into consideration in their final assessment of Zapata.
West finished his report with his impression, based on his 
very brief meeting in Morelos, that the Zapatistas were only 
minor players on the national scene. While it was true that 
Zapata was not active militarily at the time, his proximity 
to Mexico City and his guerrilla tactics made him a much 
sharper thorn in the side of the Mexican government than the 
number of troops or square miles under Zapatista control 
might have implied. As events during the Madero and Huerta 
administrations had shown, any Mexican government would have 
to pacify Zapata, either by land reform or a long-drawn, 
costly campaign, to have any kind of firm hold on the 
agriculturally rich South of Mexico. President Carranza and 
General Pablo Gonzalez eventually spent three and a half 
years and many more thousands of pesos than the strapped 
treasury could afford in attempts to subdue Zapata. In the 
end the federal government resorted to assassinating Zapata, 
but the Zapatistas, under Gildardo Magana, were still 
fighting when Carranza met his own violent death in May
1920.
Six months after West*s return, with Zapata discounted 
and Villa decimated after the battles at Celaya, President 
Wilson recognized Carranza, who had been a Senator during
19
the Porfiriato, as the leader of the de facto government of 
Mexico. Robert Lansing, who had replaced Bryan as Secretary 
of State in June 1915, was mainly concerned with preventing 
the Germans from building a base of support in Mexico, and 
was less bothered by the tactics by which Mexican leaders 
came to power. Once the U.S. had recognized Carranza, Zapata 
was once again relegated to the status of anti-government 
outlaw. There was no further mention of Emiliano Zapata in 
the Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United 
States.
It was not altogether damaging to the Zapatistas that 
the U.S. government did not actively support them. The U.S. 
and the Zapatistas would have been very tenuous allies. 
Zapata was not trying to make over Morelos in the image of 
the U.S., with individual homesteaders on their own plots of 
land. His demands for the restoration of the ejidos 
offended the sensibilities of Duval West as "socialist,"33 
as they would have seemed to many in the U.S. government.
The Zapatistas also would have been lukewarm to granting 
concessions and special privileges, as Palafox was with 
Hall, to their U.S. "allies," seeing this as simply 
replacing one set of men who would operate at the expense of 
the campesinos with another.
33 Hill, Emissaries, 312.
20
By raising a hue and cry over Villas activities, 
especially after the attacks at Santa Isabel, Chihuahua and 
Columbus, New Mexico, the U.S. pushed Carranza's government 
to focus on pacifying northern Mexico first. This bought 
the Zapatistas valuable time to accomplish their own 
agrarian revolution in Morelos.
During his lifetime the U.S. press covered Emiliano 
Zapata mainly as just an interesting sidelight to the 
Mexican Revolution. Unlike northern Mexico, there was 
little U.S. investment and few U.S. citizens in Morelos to 
demand protection for. It is possible that if Zapata had 
revolted in Chiapas, instead of just outside of Mexico City, 
the U.S. public may never have heard of him at all.
Accounts of Zapata largely reflected the view, influenced by 
the philosophies of Positivism and Social Darwinism then in 
wide circulation, that the U.S. had a right to intervene in 
Latin America and the belief in the racial inferiority of 
Latin Americans. The stories in the U.S. press came from 
journalists in New York, Washington, D.C., New Orleans, El 
Paso, or Mexico City who relied on "private advices," 
members of the "American Colony," refugees wealthy enough to 
come live in Mexico City or the United States, Mexican 
federal army press releases, agents of various revolutionary 
factions in the U.S., and, based on some of the wild stories 
of Zapatista debauchery, possibly journalists' own fertile 
imaginations. These sources all tended to reinforce either
21
interventionist or racist sentiments. The highly placed, 
wealthy Mexicans of "the better class," who had run Mexicofs 
business and government during the Porfiriato and who 
members of the American Colony would have known socially, 
looked down upon the "Indian" population of their country 
every bit as much as U.S. whites did. For example, the last 
Porfirian governor of Morelos, Pablo Escandon, wrote in 1912 
that if the Zapatistas took over Morelos, "surely we will 
retrogress to our former position as A NATION OF THE LAST 
ORDER, A TRUE NIGGERDOM"34 (his emphasis).
As John L. Johnson has pointed out in his flawed, but 
still useful 1980 work, Latin America In Caricature, popular 
notions of a "civilizing burden" to raise up the "inferior" 
peoples of Latin America were reflected and reinforced in 
U.S. newspapers through editorial cartoons showing Latin 
Americans as unruly children, subordinates, or horribly 
stereotyped blacks. Zapata, as an "Indian," could only be 
considered as barely civilized, certainly not as having a 
legitimate grievance against the "Order and Progress" of the 
Porfiriato. The New York Times, for example, acknowledged 
that some farmers of Morelos, unlike Zapata, fought for land 
rather than loot, but the paper never believed that the 
farmers had a legitimate claim to the land. Their rights 
were always described as "alleged." Although the stories
34 Womack, Revolution, 142.
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showed no evidence of the reporters having been to Morelos,
the Times did not hesitate to categorically state that the
followers of Zapata included "the majority of the
discontented plantation laborers" and "the criminal element
released from the state prison at Cuernavaca last May."
These men were characterized as uncivilized, non-Christians:
The population of Morelos numbers 175,000, a majority 
of whom are of pure Indian blood, descended from the 
old Tiahuicas, the primitive Otomis in some portion, 
and the Aztecs. These people of the Sierra of Ajusco 
and other ranges of the state retain their old language 
customs and, it is said, much of their old religion.
The most stubborn resistance has come from these 
mountain men . . .35
The press also denigrated Zapata's mental abilities as 
a military leader, insisting that he acted from irrational 
motives. For example, the Times suggested that Zapata's 
1913 attack on Cuernavaca was motivated, not by strategic 
considerations, but by his desire to loot the homes of the
town's wealthy residents because, " . . .  <Zapata's>
»
campaigns are conducted more in accordance with cupidity 
than strategy."36 Zapata was rarely the subject of magazine 
articles, but a 1912 story in the Independent by former 
Rough Rider Edwin Emerson also claimed that Zapata launched 
the Morelos revolution from strictly personal motives. 
Supposedly Zapata wanted revenge on President Diaz for 
having Zapata forcibly drafted into the army as punishment
35 New York Times, 11 March 1912.
36 New York Times, 8 Dec 1913.
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for killing a man at a cockfight in a quarrel over a 
woman.37 Even the liberal Nation, because it heavily 
supported Madero*s proclaimed reform platform, had decided 
as early as December 1911 that, "there is no one for Madero 
to deal with but petty local chieftains obviously out for 
plunder.I|38
The bandit Zapata and his "Indian" followers were 
considered newsworthy mainly because they might be capable 
of sensational atrocities and were a threat to the security 
of the lives and property in Mexico City. There were 
notices of Zapatistas having defiled women, shot innocents, 
and burned, looted, and pillaged towns in Morelos, Puebla, 
and Mexico City suburbs. As early as June 1911, the El Paso 
Herald reported that Zapata had gone to Mexico City to 
answer to Madero for charges by citizens of Morelos that 
Zapata "was leading his men in an orgy of anarchy . . . "39 
A Harper1s Weekly article described the Zapatistas in 1912 
as a "bloodthirsty horde."40 Under the 2 0 December 1913 
headline "Zapata Threatens to Attack Capital," the New York 
Times printed a notice, supposedly from Zapata, saying he
37 Edwin Emerson, "Mexican Bandits At Close View," 
Independent, 1 August 1912, 233.
38 Nation, 28 Dec 1911, 619.
39 El Paso (Texas) Herald, 21 June 1911.
40 Elisha Hollingsworth Talbot, "The Disruption of 
Mexico," Harper's Weekly, 19 October 1912, 7.
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would hang Huerta from the National Palace balcony, execute 
the Cabinet and execute without trial the officers of the 
federal army. He gave civilians five days to evacuate. On
6 April 1914, the paper reported that Zapata was holding
Bishop Jose Ocampo for ransom and had threatened to crucify 
him on Good Friday. In April 1916, the New York Times 
Magazine included a story on Zapata by Guillermo Ojara, an 
ex-reporter for the Constitutionalist newspaper, El 
Democrata, who had supposedly spent three months held in the 
Zapatista camp before he "escaped.”41 The Times took great 
pains to inform its readers that Ojara1s name translated to 
"William O'Hara" and that his father was Irish, thus 
establishing his "white" credentials and therefore his 
reliability. "O'Hara's" tale was full of thrilling details 
about the illiterate, drunken braggart, "Attila del Sur," 
who hid out in the mountains, surrounded by his ill-gotten 
gains and his 900 man "Death Legion."
As far as the press was concerned, if the government of 
Mexico could not control Zapata, then the government of the
United States, as a stronger and wiser nation, had a
41 Ojara claimed that he had been captured off of a 
train by Zapatistas and held for three months. He says he 
returned to Mexico City after his escape, but Carranza had 
him arrested as a Zapatista spy. He was released only on 
his promise to leave the country. I have found no record of 
this in any other source. It is possible that Ojara was a 
Constitutionalist propagandist hoping to lessen the 
likelihood that the U.S. would recognize the Zapatista 
faction in the coming struggle for the government of Mexico.
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paternal duty to intervene on the behalf of its own citizens 
and to save the Mexican people from themselves. Emiliano 
Zapata just proved that Mexico needed "discipline" of the 
kind provided by Porfirio Diaz and that the U.S. had a long 
and difficult mission ahead if it intended to "civilize" 
Mexico. In September 1912, the New York Times noted that, 
"Zapata still eludes the not overvigilant police and
/ p
regulars." A year later they said:
The great embarrassment to the Constitutionalist cause 
flowing from Zapata's activities is that he operates so 
near the Mexican capital that his misdeeds are almost 
certain to be noticed by the civilized world.43
If Zapata had posed a direct threat to significant amounts
of U.S. property and lives, it would not have been unlikely
for the press to advocate intervention, as it did in the
cases of Huerta and Villa.
There was one period of exception to this standard
portrait. As the Huerta government crumbled under the
»
pressures of Zapatista, Carrancista, and Villista revolution 
and the U.S. occupation of Veracruz, the press considered 
the possibility that Zapata could end up in control of 
Mexico. They attempted, briefly, in late 1914 and early 
1915, to take him seriously, referring sometimes to his 
followers as "troops" rather than "hordes," and to Zapata as 
"General." The El Paso Herald, closer to the scene and in
42 New York Times, 4 September 1912.
43 New York Times, 8 December 1913.
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contact with a Zapatista agent in San Antonio, sometimes 
carried fairly accurate assessments, in addition to the 
standard purple prose. The paper did report in May 1914, 
that Zapata was preparing to take Mexico City and had sent 
threats to "leading citizens and their wives and daughters" 
including one man who was told that "Zapata would cut off 
his ears and 'eat them fried.'"44 The Herald, however, 
seemed to have a good grasp of the relations between the 
Zapatistas and other factions, noting that Zapata had 
repudiated Carranza because Carranza would not accept the 
"Plan of Ayala, the original agrarian proclamation of the 
southern leader."45 The paper described, several months 
later, the believable Zapatista suspicions of a coalition 
with Villa because too many ex-Huertistas, Felicistas, and 
federals had joined Villa and would soon "control" him.46 A 
surprising account of the much-dreaded Zapatista occupation 
of Mexico City came out in the 16 January 1915 Harper’s 
Weekly. Allene Tupper Wilkes, a foreign resident of Mexico 
City, reported that "the gentle Zapatistas" peacefully 
controlled the city without looting or rampaging.
Soon, however, the coalition Convention government 
proved itself a shaky institution, with three presidents in
44 El Paso (Texas) Herald, 11 May 1914.
45 El Paso (Texas) Herald, 30 June 1914.
46 El Paso (Texas) Herald, 3 Oct 1914.
less than a year. Carrancista General Pablo Gonzalez took 
Mexico City in August 1915, and the Convention fled to 
Toluca, where by October it had disintegrated, its nub 
retreating to Cuernavaca. On 19 October 1915, the Wilson 
administration recognized the Carrancistas as the de facto 
government of Mexico and in the press Zapata fell back into 
the category of marauding bandit, when he was mentioned at 
all.
From this point up to Zapata's assassination in April 
1919, the Morelos revolutionary surfaced only occasionally 
in the press, in an article such as "William O'Hara's" or a 
notice of a Zapatista defeat or defection to the 
Carrancistas.47 The U.S. public was more concerned with 
Villa's depredations, the Pershing Expedition, and 
especially the progress of the war in Europe. Zapata's 
death, when mentioned at all, was noted as the demise of a 
"Rebel Chief," "Leader of Indians," or "Bandit Leader."
Reinforcing and reflecting the press image of Zapata 
and the outlook of the day were the two volumes, published 
in 1916 and 1917, of the correspondence of Edith 
O 'Shaughnessy. 0'Shaughnessy went to Mexico twice as the 
wife of the U.S. charge d'affaires. Her first stay, as 
chronicled in her letters to her mother, during the fall of
47 For example, between 1916 and 1919 the New York 
Times ran a total of only 2 2 articles on Zapata, including 
three covering his assassination. In 1917 Zapata appeared 
only three times and in 1918 not at all.
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the Diaz administration, the de la Barra interim, and the 
first part of Madero*s presidency, is recorded in Diplomatic 
Days. A Diplomat's Wife In Mexico covers the middle period 
of Huerta's government, until the 0*Shaughnessys were handed 
their passports after the U.S. invasion of Veracruz in April 
1914. Unlike many who wrote about Mexico, 0'Shaughnessy was 
fairly well-read in the country's history. In her letters 
she makes references to reading Walter Webb Prescott's and 
Alexander von Humboldt's histories of Mexico, the letters of 
Fanny Calderon de la Barca, the wife of the Spanish minister 
to Mexico City in the 1840s, Cortes' letters, and Bernal 
Diaz.
O 'Shaughnessy shared the racial views of her day and 
social class. She saw the Mexican Indians as a "passionate, 
tenacious, mysterious, gifted, undisciplined race" and felt 
that they needed a dictator to rule them.48 At one point 
she scoffed at the idea, suggested in a New York newspaper, 
that Diaz's dictatorial rule actually caused the rebellions 
in the north and south of Mexico. Emiliano Zapata she saw 
as a bandit, a marauder, not as a revolutionary. She 
granted that he claimed to have a cause, aside from personal 
gain, but doubted that cause's justness and Zapata's 
Sincerity. In Diplomatic Days she said:
Those who know tell me that Zapata is atavistic in
type, desirous of Mexico for the Indians . . . "Mexico
48 Edith 0'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife In Mexico (New 
York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1916), 17.
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for the Indians” really means a sponging out of 
everything between us and Montezuma . . .  49
Three years later she expressed her opinion even more
strongly:
Zapata has been the terror of every President —  Diaz, 
de la Barra, Madero, and Huerta —  for nearly five 
years. His crimes and depredations are committed under 
the banner of "Land for the People" . . . but that he 
has, after these years of bloodshed, rapine, and loot, 
rendered conditions more tolerable for any except the 
rapers and looters, is most debatable.50
Like the press, in her letters home 0 1Shaughnessy paid only
a little attention to Zapata, usually when he had attacked a
Mexico City suburb. Generally she made light of his
activities, surely in part to avoid alarming her mother, but
perhaps also because her reading of Mexican history had led
her to see Zapata as just a continuation of 19th century
banditry that only had been held in check during the
Porfiriato.
Although the New York Times Review of Books disliked 
>
both works and the Nation faulted A Diplomat•s Wife in 
Mexico for the "indiscretion" of revealing inside diplomatic 
maneuvering so soon after the fact, 0'Shaughnessy's books 
were otherwise well-received as interesting and informative 
reports from an eyewitness to the recent Mexican upheavals. 
The Literary Digest said, "Chiefly significant, however, is
/ g  o t §Edith 0'Shaughnessy, Diplomatic Days (New York: Harper
and Brothers Publishers, 1917), 101.
50 0 'Shaughnessy, Wife, 218.
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the light she throws on the somewhat perplexing career of
Madero."51 The North American Review appreciated
O *Shaughnessy*s "plain-speaking" with "no appearance of
bias," and her presentation of Huerta:
. . . he <the reader> will find sympathy hard to
withhold from this shrewd, deep man <Huerta>, to all
appearances not avaricious, to all appearances striving 
for peace and order, heavily burdened, cruelly 
handicapped. Certainly Huerta seems to shine by 
contrast with such men as Villa and Zapata.52
In September of 1919, five months after Zapata's
assassination, Republican Senator Albert B. Fall called for
hearings to "investigate the matter of outrages on citizens
of the United States in Mexico." His primary purpose was to
embarrass the Wilson administration in the midst of the
fight to ratify the Versailles treaty and to produce
propaganda for the Republicans in the upcoming presidential
elections. Fall himself owned property in Mexico53 and was
later convicted in the Teapot Dome oil scandal of accepting
>
a $100,000 bribe from Edward L. Doheny, owner of two oil 
companies located in Mexico.54 Given this background it is
51 Review of Diplomatic Days, by Edith O 'Shaughnessy, 
Literary Digest, 8 December 1917, 48.
52 Review of A Diplomat’s Wife In Mexico, by Edith 
0'Shaughnessy, North American Review, August 1916, 3 02.
53 Robert E. Quirk, Mexico, The Modern Nations in 
Historical Perspective Series, ed. Robin W. Winks,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,1971),
94.
54 Ernest Gruening, Many Battles: The Autobiography of
Ernest Gruening (New York: Liveright, 1973), 108.
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not surprising that Fall was willing to give credence to the
negative portraits of Zapata and his movement provided by
most of those who testified on the subject.
William Frank Buckley, who had worked in real estate
and oil leases in Mexico since 1908, was typical of many who
testified. He despised the reform Constitution of 1917, and
characterized it as, "the principal reforms being the
destruction of private property and the expulsion from the
country of the Americans."55 He had no use for Zapata or
land reform and disdained those, such as H.L. Hall, who
attempted to present the Zapatista case. Buckley testified:
Mr. H.L. Hall was another discredited American living 
in Mexico and was appointed a special representative to 
Zapata. He is now and has been for several years a 
Zapatista propagandist.56
Eber Cole Byam, who had lived and worked in Mexico during
the Porfiriato from 1895 to 1907, also testified, rather
erroneously, on land reform. He claimed that Mexico had had
>
for years a U.S.-style Homestead Act which the campesinos 
refused to take advantage of. He felt this was to their 
benefit, however, as it relieved them of having to pay land 
taxes and of the "burdens" of land ownership. Byam implied 
in his testimony that "Indians" were not able to deal with
55 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Investigation of Mexican Affairs, Preliminary Report and 
Hearings of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 66th Cong., 
1st sess., 8 September 1919, 769.
56 Senate, Investigation, 814.
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responsibility and needed the discipline of a strong 
president like Porfirio Diaz, ideas that were also common in 
the U.S. media. Diplomat Nelson 0 1Shaughnessy, who served • 
at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City during the Diaz, Madero, 
and Huerta regimes, was inclined to agree with Byam. He 
testified, ". . . 1  think the whole Mexican land situation
has been very much exaggerated.1,57 Like many of the wealthy 
Mexicans he would have met in his work in Mexico City,
O 'Shaughnessy did not believe there was a land distribution 
problem in Mexico. Since there was no real cause for a 
grievance, Zapata was little more than a bandit. George C. 
Carothers attempted to bring a little positive information 
to light on Zapata during his testimony, but, as the Wilson 
administration's special representative to Francisco Villa, 
the subcommittee found his information on the Zapatistas' 
peaceful occupation of Mexico City highly suspect.
The only North American ever to meet Zapata who 
testified extensively before the subcommittee was William E. 
Gates. Gates was a very wealthy Cleveland businessman who, 
in the middle of his life, moved to a theosophical community 
near San Diego and took up the study of Mayan hieroglyphics, 
linguistics, and archeology. He achieved some measure of 
success in his new field, publishing articles in the Peabody 
Museum's bulletin at Harvard and for an anthropological
57 Ibid. , 2706.
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congress in Geneva. Through his California acquaintance, 
and long-time Morelos resident, H.L. Hall, Gates became 
interested in the current Mexican political situation. In 
July 1917, Gates traveled to Mexico and spent the next nine 
months in Yucatan, Oaxaca, and Morelos, where he met with 
Zapata. On his return Gates wrote several glowing articles 
on Zapata for the North American Review and World's Work in 
January and April 1919, just before Zapata's assassination, 
which, had they come sooner, might have sparked more media 
interest in Zapata. As it was, news of Zapata's 
assassination crossed the U.S. during the spring and summer 
of 1919, after which the Morelos rebellion was considered 
resolved. Gates had also attempted in the first half of 
1919, to interest President Wilson in the Zapatistas, now 
led by Magana, who Gates said were willing to form a 
coalition government with Felix Diaz, and several other 
"moderate" chiefs to replace the "anti-American, bolshevist, 
syndicalist"59 Carranza who ruled, as Gates said, not by the 
Constitution, but by "fiat decrees."60 From January to 
August 1919, Gates wrote a series of letters to Secretary of 
War Newton Baker, who he had known from college and from 
Cleveland, asking Baker to speak to President Wilson about
co (
Womack, Revolution, 298.
59 Senate, Investigation, 2844.
60 Ibid. , 314.
34
supporting the Zapatistas when Carranza*s government fell.
Gates was a staunch anti-interventionist and believed that
if the U.S. supported the coalition it would assure some
kind of orderly transfer of power and eliminate the need for
intervention. The Californian was also motivated by his
belief that the problems of Latin American were rooted in
the struggles of the native peoples:
I did it <tried to support the coalition> . . . 
because I care for my Indians; because they can come 
back? because they are the great bulk of the population 
and are not an "inferior race'1 —  only a suppressed 
one? and because their economic regeneration means the 
peaceful solution forever of the Mexican - Central 
American problem. And I do not suppose I have to say 
that Carranza will never do it.61
Gates tried to go through Baker, instead of the State
Department, because he felt that State was thoroughly pro-
Carranza and would refuse to hear anything against him.
Baker, however, refused to get involved in bringing Gates'
information to the President. Gates testified before the
>
subcommittee that on 9 September 1919, he delivered to the 
White House a document signed by Magana, Diaz, and several 
others explaining why they were against Carranza and giving 
their pledge to form a coalition. There is no evidence to 
suggest that Wilson took this into consideration, because 
probably he held with Duval West's interpretation that the 
Zapatistas just were not very important, and the president 
supported Carranza to the end of the Wilson administration.
61 Ibid., 316.
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With the Versailles Treaty ratification fight on his mind, 
Mexico was not his top foreign policy priority.
Although Gates® testimony was favorable to Zapata, it 
was generally accepted by the subcommittee because Gates was 
able to prove he was entirely independent, financially and 
politically, in his research and because, for his own 
reasons, Gates shared the subcommittee's antipathy for 
Venustiano Carranza. Gates was convinced that Carranza's 
ties to the Casa Del Obrero Mundial (House of the World 
Worker) and Yucatan's governor Salvador Alvarado marked 
Carranza as a "Bolshevik." The Zapatistas, on the other 
hand, simply wanted, "Land for the people of Morelos, for 
the common people of Morelos, and nothing else."62
Chairman Fall thanked William Gates for his 
"interesting and intelligent testimony,"63 but the 
subcommittee's final report reflected the political 
considerations that had led to it being convened in the 
first place. The report supported the bulk of the testimony 
gathered and recommended that the U.S. government should 
declare inapplicable to U.S. citizens all of the reform 
provisions of the Constitution of 1917, especially Article 
27 that stated, "The nation shall at all times have the
62 Ibid. , 2814.
63 Ibid.
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right to impose on private property such limitations as the 
public interest may demand, . . . 1,64
It is telling to contrast the majority U.S. diplomatic 
and media reaction to the fight of the Zapatistas with their 
reaction to the struggles of Rosalie Caden Evans. Evans had 
married an Englishman in Puebla in 1898, and lived in Mexico 
until just after the assassination of Francisco Madero in 
February 1913. The Evanses had all their money invested in 
Mexico, however, so Harry Evans was forced to return to 
Puebla to avoid bankruptcy in 1917. While there he died and 
in 1918, Rosalie Evans returned to Mexico and attempted to 
settle at the large estate she and her husband had owned, 
hacienda San Pedro Coxtocan.
The hacienda had been partially broken up, in 
accordance with the new land laws. Parts had been granted 
as ejidos and another part President Obregon was in the 
process of taking "in the public interest" to use for an 
agricultural school. Evans would have none of this and 
battled agrarians, bandits, and Presidents Carranza and 
Obregon, to regain full possession. She went through the 
Mexican government and English diplomatic channels, tried 
bluffing and bullying local officials, and eventually 
resorted to arms to combat a seige of her property.
64 Meyer and Sherman, Course, 54 4.
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Finally, in August 1924, Evans was shot and killed while 
bringing a payroll back to the hacienda.
Like Zapata, Evans fought the Mexican government,
". . .to prove it's mine <the land>, government or no
government."65 Like Zapata, she did not shy away from 
violence when the established system offered no remedy. 
Besieged at the hacienda in June of 1924, she wrote, "I 
almost hope we fight it out before they <rescuers> arrive. 
Nothing will ever teach them, unless we do."66 And, like 
Zapata, the land she fought for did not belong to her in the 
strictly legal sense. Once Evans took to arms, however, the 
U.S. media hailed her as a heroine.
The case of Rosalie Caden Evans highlighted the 
assumptions that motivated the U.S. government and press to 
almost uniformly ignore or reject Zapata and his movement. 
Had these people simply been opposed to Zapata because he 
rejected the law* or because he used violence to stand up 
for his rights, there would have been a similar outcry 
against Evans. They had, however, a certain vision of the 
U.S. role in Latin America. They would shoulder the "white 
man's burden" to be builders and shapers, and for their 
pains deserved privileges and respect from properly grateful
65 Rosalie Caden Evans, The Rosalie Evans Letters From 
Mexico, ed. Daisy Caden Pettus (Indianapolis, Indiana: The 
Bobbs-Merrill Company, Publishers, 1926), 65.
66 New York Times, 2 2 June 1924.
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governments and peoples. Emiliano Zapata and his agrarian
goals absolutely did not fit into this picture. As a non-
white his leadership ability was denigrated, and as a man
rebelling against a system that had welcomed U.S. investment
and supported U.S. privilege he was called a bandit. "The
courageous Mrs. Evans," on the other hand, was described in
the press as a lone fighter for justice:
This woman is a widow, who for several years has
blocked, often with arms, the efforts of Bolshevist 
politicians of Puebla to seize a fine estate jointly 
developed by herself and her late husband. The 
buildings on the estate were burned by the Obregon 
soldiers and the lone woman defender escaped only 
because of the fidelity of her servants.6
She had come to Mexico and built up San Pedro Coxtocan out
of the "wilderness," providing jobs to the Indians from the
surrounding villages:
The hacienda was farmed by Indians, who received a 
large share of the produce. These small farmers were 
satisfied with the terms on which they occupied the 
land under the management of the Evanses . . . .68
>
The Literary Digest had the last word on Zapata and his men, 
characterizing them as men "who preferred the life of 
bandits to honest toil,".69 Several days after Evans* 
death, however, the New York Times published her last letter 
which the paper said, "showed that Mrs. Evans realized that
67 New York Times, 23 Feb 1924.
68 New York Times, 22 June 1924.
69 "Is This The End of Emiliano Zapata, The Mexican 
Rebel?" Literary Digest, 5 July 1919, 79.
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her life was unsafe at her ranch, but stated that it was a 
matter of sacred duty for her to stay and uphold the law and 
justice. ,|7°
70 New York Times, 6 Aug 1924.
CHAPTER II
A REVERSION IN FORM
It was not just gunboat diplomatists and old 
reactionaries nostalgic for the Porfiriato who objected to 
Zapata. Many "liberals" in the years before World War II 
also found it hard to side with Zapata, although for much 
different reasons. The works of Frank Tannenbaum and Ernest 
Gruening reflected the views on Zapata of many of those who 
supported a reform agenda of the type described by a 1913 
reader of the Nation as "clean honest government, equal 
rights, incorruptible judiciary, abolition of the spoils 
system, universal suffrage, and representative, republican 
institutions. "71
The career bf Ernest Gruening (1887-197 4) spanned the 
fields of medicine, journalism, and politics. After 
graduating from Harvard Medical School in 1912, Gruening
71 Nation, 25 Dec 1913, 615. This letter to the editor 
was in protest of an article in Nation, 11 December 1913, 
555, that, while saying it could not defend the actions of 
"bandits" such as Zapata, understood that these men were 
motivated by the feeling that, "the ’law' as administered 
from above is intended not for their benefit but for their 
subjection." The letter writer was appalled that the 
magazine could suggest that Zapata had any right on his side 
at all.
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began his journalism career in Boston. As managing editor
of the Boston Traveler he crusaded for women's suffrage,
advocated dropping advertisements for "quack" cures, and
wrote editorials criticizing the film Birth of a Nation as
racist. Gruening was a early member of the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People and made
it Traveler policy to:
Refer to the color of the individual only when it is of 
particular and special interest and when the story is 
manifestly incomplete and inaccurate if the color of 
the person involved is concealed.72
Gruening's personal exposure to Latin American issues 
began with his work shortly after World War I on La Prensa, 
a U.S. Spanish-language daily. Then, on becoming managing 
editor of the Nation in 192 0, Gruening fought for the end of 
"gunboat diplomacy," especially in Haiti and the Dominican 
Republic. During the Senate hearings on the possibility of
ending the U.S. military occupation, Gruening went to Haiti
>
at the request of chairman Medill McCormick to screen 
witnesses for the hearings to be held on the island.
In December of 1922, Gruening left the Nation to do a 
series on Mexico for Colliers magazine, which had a wider 
circulation. He travelled to Mexico with his wife and two 
sons to research the country which was very much in the U.S. 
news at that time. President Harding had refused to 
recognize the Obregon regime and article 27 of the
72 Gruening, Battles, 51.
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Constitution of 1917 had provoked much resentment among U.S. 
oil companies and citizens with interests in Mexico.
Gruening was favorably impressed with President Obregon and 
the other "revolutionaries" he met, including Diego Rivera, 
Jose Vasconcelos, Elena Torres, and Manuel Gamio. He also 
contacted the U.S. embassy and members of the U.S. business 
community in Mexico, but noted, "I could not but feel that 
these 'eyes and ears' of our State Department were 
singularly defective,"73 with their attitude of nostalgia 
for the Porfiriato. In preparing his articles Gruening also 
interviewed many Mexicans in government positions "since 
virtually all the Mexican officialdom had been participants 
and eyewitnesses to the events of the revolutionary 
decade. "74
Once back in the U.S. Gruening decided to write a book 
about the Mexican Revolution, ". . .— the book, I hoped—  
describing the r*oots of the Revolution deep in the past, its 
present accomplishments, and its prospects for the 
future."75 In this description of the Revolution, Mexico 
and its Heritage (1928), Emiliano Zapata played a small and 
somewhat negative role, for several reasons.
73 Ibid. , 112.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., 118.
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Gruening was a personal friend of both Obregon and 
Calles and got much of his information from government 
officials of these men's administrations. So quite 
naturally, the 1910 to 1920 portion of Gruening1s story 
emphasized the Carrancista faction that Obregon had come 
from and described other groups, including the Zapatistas, 
mainly in relation to the Constitutionalists. In the 
chapter titled "The Revolution" Zapata is mentioned only 
twice, in passing. To Carranza, Zapata was a problem, a 
rebel, someone who stood in the way of the government.
At the time Gruening wrote his book, documentation on 
Zapata and his movement was difficult to come by. Much of 
what has become the Archivo de Zapata was in the personal 
possession of Gildardo and Octavio Magana until the early 
1960s.76 Gruening did not appear to have read a complete 
copy of the Plan de Ayala or else he misinterpreted it. 
Throughout Mexicb and its Heritage he represented it simply 
as calling for "immediate expropriation of one third of the 
land of the haciendas, and its division among the 
landless."77 It is certainly true that the Plan stated:
". . . there will be expropriated the third part of
those monopolies from the powerful proprietors of them, 
with prior indemnization, in order that the pueblos and
76 Womack, Revolution, 414.
77 Ernest Gruening, Mexico And Its Heritage (New York: 
The Century Co., 1928), 142.
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citizens of Mexico may obtain ejidos, colonies, and 
foundations for pueblos, . . . "78 (my emphasis)
The Plan de Ayala, however, was much more than a short
declaration of expropriation. It presented the just
grievances of the Zapatistas, set up a plan to form a new
government of Mexico, and organized the beginnings of an
agrarian reform program. In his failure to understand this
key document, Gruening failed to locate the lens through
which Zapatafs actions and importance could be viewed in
perspective. Without it, Zapata was saved from becoming
just another minor caudillo or bandit leader only by
Gruening1s recognition that, " . . .  the simon-pure bandit,
the bandit who posed as a revolutionist, the revolutionist
who behaved like a bandit, and the poor peasant who had to
maraud in order not to starve, were often indistinguishable 
. .7 9
• • •
The main reason why Gruening did not believe Zapata to 
>
be a positive, important force in the Revolution has to do 
with Gruening1s standard of measurement of a society's 
"progress." Gruening subscribed to the ideal of a 
democratic society based on a healthy middle class and a 
backbone of yeoman farmers, as well as effective universal 
suffrage and "clean government." To his credit, he applied 
his standards just as strongly to the U.S. and often
7 0 ,
Womack, Revolution, 402.
79 Gruening, Heritage, 105.
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supported, in print and in personal actions, causes such as 
women's suffrage and progressive candidates for office such 
as Robert LaFollette. Throughout Mexico and its Heritage, 
however, it is clear that Gruening measured Mexico's 
progress by these U.S. standards.
In his large chapter on "The Land" he praised the
rancheros, characterizing them as "the only rural middle
• 80 • class Mexico has known." Unlike either the hacendados or
peones they paid taxes and were almost completely self-
supporting. He bemoaned the fact that circumstances
severely limited the expansion of this group:
The growth of this class would have been highly 
beneficial to Mexico. Although usually situated on the 
poorer hillsides, these ranchos were intensively 
cultivated. In the wide uplands that encircle the 
Valley of Toluca the deep green patches and scattered 
white farm houses, so unlike the rambling hacienda or 
huddled pueblo, tell unmistakably of independent effort 
and small ownership. . . . Had the small holding been
successfully encouraged from the start how different 
might have been Mexico's history!81 
»
Zapata did not fight for the rancheros, however. He fought
for the peones and for their ejidos. Gruening only accepted
* • • • 82 ejidosr "a reversion m  form," as a stepping stone to
individual land ownership. The ejido, in and of itself, was
not the future, but rather a key to the future, "an equal
opportunity to start and protection in a fair subsistence in
80 Ibid., 124.
81 Ibid., 125.
82 Ibid., 166.
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exchange for hard work? an initial paternalism —  an early 
tutelage to be grown out of by directed self-help,
« * • 83 •individual and common effort." Measured by Gruening*s own 
standard of progress, Zapata appears to be at worst, a 
reactionary or at best, advocating a half-way measure.
To sum up Mexico*s political progress Gruening wrote, 
"In the larger aspects of politics, it may be asserted 
flatly that no progress whatever has been made since Mexican
o/
Independence." He blamed continuing personalism,
certainly an aspect of Zapatismo, and the chaotic state of
local politics, citing Morelos as a particularly bad
example. The only possible salvation of Mexico for
"democracy" would be through agrarian reform, not as Zapata
envisioned it, but a remodelling along U.S. patterns:
If this reform can be continued uninterruptedly through
a generation, Mexico will be transformed —  from a
nation of serfs to one of small independent
landholders.85
*
Frank Tannenbaum (1893-1969) was a noted U.S. scholar
of Latin American history. He began his career in the 1910s
attending night classes at the Ferrer School, "the first
• 86institution devoted to the constructive side of anarchism"
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 662.
85 Ibid., 663.
86 Joseph Maier and Richard W. Weatherhead, Frank 
Tannenbaum: A Biographical Essay (New York: University
Seminars, Columbia University, 1974), 3.
47
and was an IWW activist. In 1914, Tannenbaum, then 21 years 
old, served a year in jail for leading a sit-down strike of
• • 87189 unemployed men at a New York City Catholic church. He
wrote several books on labor and prison reform and then
became interested in Mexico through his work with Century
magazine and The Survey, In the wake of the de la Huerta
rebellion, he put together the May 1924 issue of The Survey
devoted solely to Mexico and the future of its revolution,
including articles by Felipe Carrillo Puerto, Plutarco Elias
Calles, Manuel Gamio, Jose Vasconcelos, Diego Rivera, and
Tannenbaum*s own article, "Mexico— A Promise."
Throughout his career Tannenbaum was interested in the
broad issue of institutional reform: what type of reform to
strive for and how it could best be achieved. When his jail
term was up and Tannenbaum went on to Columbia University he
soon discovered alternatives to radical activism. He later
said: >
Until I went to school I thought there was only one way 
to accomplish an end. Now I know that there are many 
ways. The study of history is dangerous to 
radicalism.88
Tannenbaum, however, never denied the people's right to 
armed revolt if that was what it would take to start reform. 
In "Mexico— A Promise" he described the Mexican Constitution 
of 1917:
87 Ibid. , 4.
88 Ibid. , 11.
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. . . a promise which needs fulfillment. If the
promise remains unfulfilled, it will again, as the 
constitutions in Mexico have been before, become a good 
and legitimate excuse for revolution.89
It was this view of reform and the role of revolution
in achieving reform that influenced Tannenbaum*s views on
Emiliano Zapata. Of all his books on Mexico, the 1930
Mexican Agrarian Revolution devoted the most concentrated
attention to Zapata and his movement. Zapata stood for
economic change first and foremost with his insistence upon
land reform, but he also provided, and continues to provide,
ethical and spiritual leadership. Tannenbaum points out,
"The importance of Zapata lies in the fact that he had but
0 • • • • * 90one basic aim and that he died fighting for it," rather
than insincerely adopting a reform platform, as Carranza did
in Veracruz, or selling out the revolution for personal
gain. Not only did Zapata win Tannenbaum*s approval with
the ethical example he set, but also with the continuing
»
spiritual invigoration Zapata gave to the "Indians" of 
Mexico:
Another important phase of the Zapatista influence is 
what is known as indianismo. . . .  it was the fact that 
Zapata held Mexico at bay, that the Indian fought and 
won, that has given the present Mexican movement its
89 • «Frank Tannenbaum, "Mexico— A Promise," Survey, 1 May 
1924, 131.
90 Frank Tannenbaum, The Mexican Agrarian Revolution 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1930), 162.
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strong racial flavor. Zapata wrote the Indian note
into contemporary Mexican history.91
Tannenbaum believed the Zapatistas had the right to 
revolt and made important contributions to reform through 
their revolt. In his 193 3 book Peace by Revolution, he 
stressed that the Constitution 1857, founded as it was on 
U.S. and European notions of a single, homogeneous nation, 
could never be applicable to Mexico until the "social 
disequilibrium" there was brought into balance, probably by 
violent revolution.92 Zapata's attempts to bring the 
campesinos of Morelos within the Porfirian system, attempts 
to gain for them land and justice, were consistently 
thwarted, leading to Zapata's participation in the Madero 
rebellion. Then, when Francisco Madero proved no more 
amenable to change, Zapata was again justified in taking to 
the field. Tannenbaum held that in these rebellions Zapata 
did important work to break down the "social 
disequilibrium," by becoming a nationwide symbol of the 
revolution, although this was a delayed reaction, and by 
articulating the unifying theme of the revolution, Tierra y 
Libertad.
Tannenbaum did not, however, see a successful 
revolution as the ultimate goal. In The Labor Movement: Its
91 Ibid.
92 Frank Tannenbaum, Peace By Revolution (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1933), 111.
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Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (1921) ,
Tannenbaum wrote:
It is the ideal aim of the labor movement to abolish 
revolutions. It aims to eliminate the cost of human 
sacrifice due to social change hv making change a 
pragmatic and deliberate thing.9
This belief is the reason that Tannenbaum, although he
admired Zapata and condoned his actions, focused mainly on
the achievements of Obregon, Calles, and those who came
after them in The Mexican Agrarian Revolution, Peace by
Revolution, and Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread.
Zapata is too far toward the radical end of the spectrum to
be one of Tannenbaum*s real heroes. Although Tannenbaum
recognized the insincerity of Carranza's reform agenda, he
noted in Peace By Revolution (193 3), "It gave him the
support of agraristas who believed in Zapata's cause, but
who, for one reason or another, did not follow Zapata in his
ruthless and violent struggle against great odds.”94 In
»
this book Tannenbaum reiterated his belief that Zapata's 
biggest contribution was as part of the "profound spiritual 
and social change"95 in Mexico, the new awareness and 
respect for the "Indian" and his culture. Tannenbaum saw an
93 Frank Tannenbaum, The Labor Movement: Its 
Conservative Functions and Social Consequences (New York: 
G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1921)? quoted in Maier and Weatherhead, 
Tannenbaum, 7.
94 Tannenbaum, Peace By Revolution, 162.
95 Ibid., 180.
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important progression away from revolution toward government 
sponsored reform after 1920. The leaders of the 1920s 
managed to associate the government with social reform and 
redefine, as reactionary, anti-government rebels like de la 
Huerta. Obregon was able to make peace with the Zapatistas, 
and in so doing was able to take steps toward agrarian 
reform in a "pragmatic and deliberate" way, rather than at 
gunpoint. Tannenbaum was always ready to admit the 
shortcomings of the government programs, but contended that 
the true heroes of Mexicofs recent history were the men who 
reformed the peace that had been won by the revolution.
Men such as Gruening and Tannenbaum truly wished to see 
Mexico progress. They wanted to see a respect for Mexico 
and its people, racially and diplomatically, grow in the 
U.S. But their goals for Mexico, and their standards of 
measurement of achievement of those goals, came straight out 
of the U.S. context. Zapata was a violent social 
revolutionary, not a U.S.-style liberal who had wandered a 
little too far south. To Gruening and Tannenbaum, who 
applauded reform as the ultimate goal, Zapata*s violent 
revolution seemed reactionary, or at best still left a lot 
of work to be done.
"Liberal" opinion of this period, of course, was not 
monolithic. Journalist and author Carleton Beals dropped 
the U.S. agenda and explored Latin America on its own terms, 
beginning with a 1918 trip to Yucatan. From there he went
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on to Mexico City and established the English Preparatory
Institute, taught at the American High School, and tutored
President Carranza*s military staff in English.96 His 1923
work, Mexico: An Interpretation, was one of the first books
in English to analyze at length the 1910-1920 period of the
Mexican Revolution.
Beals believed that the main issue of the revolution
was land reform. He had specific ideas about what the goals
of the reform should be and these colored his opinion of
Zapata. He wrote:
It is doubtful, therefore, if the Mexican land problem 
can be solved entirely in the "American" and Fascist 
manner, by the creation of small proprietors.97
Beals, unlike Gruening, who advocated the building of a
Mexican rural middle class of small landholders, was willing
to judge the Mexican Revolution in the Mexican context and
measure it by Mexican standards. This led him to a positive
assessment of Zapata*s role as an agrarian reformer with
legitimate goals and some influence.
Beals cited Francisco Madero*s **inability to institute
adequate reform," (Beals* emphasis) and his waste of
precious financial resources in attempting to crush those,
especially Zapata, who demanded reform, with bringing about
96 Twentieth Century Authors, 1942 ed., s.v. "Carleton 
Beals. **
97 Carleton Beals, Mexico: An Interpretation (New York:
B.W. Huebsch, Inc., 1923), 92.
53
* # • 98 ,the downfall of the Madero administration. For Beals, it 
was clearly Madero, not Zapata, who was responsible for 
undermining the government and making possible the coup 
d'etat of General Victoriano Huerta. Beals made the same 
case about Carranza's resistance to Zapata's legitimate 
reform agenda. Beals pointed out that President Alvaro 
Obregon, who implemented a combination of demobilization 
with land reform in the form of military colonies, only 
needed to station thirty federales in Cuernavaca, in the 
heart of Zapata country "— where some six months previously 
Carranza had been conducting a campaign that was costing his 
Government for a time over $300,000 (pesos) a day."99
Not only did Zapata have legitimate goals, but Beals 
maintained that Zapata had an influence on the direction of 
the revolution. Beals was the first U.S. writer to 
elaborate on the Zapatista influence at the Queretaro 
constitutional convention of 1917. He believed that the 
radical clauses on land reform that modified the 
conservative constitution Carranza had originally presented 
to the convention resulted in part from "the pressure of 
Zapata in the south."100
98 Ibid. , 52.
99 Ibid. , 78.
100 Ibid., 55.
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Mexico: An Interpretation provided the U.S. public a
very early and positive look at the concrete progress made 
by Zapata in his lifetime in Morelos. In Mexico Beals met 
and talked to Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, a Mexico City lawyer 
who had fled from the Huerta administration to work with the 
Zapatistas. From the lawyer Beals learned the details of 
agrarian reform in Morelos and found much to praise. He 
described the formation of agrarian commissions to organize 
land surveys and land distribution and a rural credit bank 
to help farmers get started with seed and tools. He 
concluded:
Hand in hand went the work of creating a rural bank
. . . and through this and provisional land
repartition, the state of Morelos beneath the
"Convention Government" <in Cuernavaca> achieved 
• • 101 comparative prosperity.
All three of these men, Gruening, Tannenbaum, and 
Beals, in describing Zapata, continued to examine the proper 
role of the U.S.,in Latin America. Beals approached the 
Zapatista revolution the way he hoped the U.S. would 
approach relations with Mexico in general. He went to the 
source, got the facts, and judged them in the Mexican 
context, instead of trying to make over Mexico into a junior 
United States. He came away from his study of the 
Zapatistas, not with a head full of romantic notions about 
"saving" Mexico like William Gates, but with a healthy
101 Ibid., 97.
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respect for what Zapata tried to accomplish. Gruening and 
Tannenbaum each represented Zapata according to their views 
on the issue of reform in the U.S. Beals, while he shared 
many of these opinions on reform at home, had a 
fundamentally different view of the role of the U.S. in 
Latin America. Gruening and Tannenbaum saw the U.S. 
position as role-model and teacher, rather than exploiter 
with a "big stick," but their view was still essentially a 
paternalistic one. Gruening later served the administration 
of Franklin Roosevelt for several years as the chief U.S. 
administrator on Puerto Rico. Tannenbaum eventually came to 
support the extension of this paternalism around the globe 
saying:
. . . had we followed the traditional and expected 
policy of the great nations in regard to little ones 
then our present role in the world as champions of the 
small state against direct or indirect subversion could 
not have had the force of public approval it now
102 •Frank Tannenbaum, Mexico: The Struggle For Peace
and Bread (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950? reprint 1960),
291-92.
CHAPTER III
SYMBOL OF IMMENSE PREACHMENT
At the end of 1927, U.S.-Mexican relations began to 
thaw. President Coolidge reached a settlement with Mexico 
on the claims of the oil companies, and he replaced the 
abrasive Ambassador James Sheffield with Dwight Morrow. 
Ambassador Morrow worked hard to improve relations with 
Mexico and to popularize the country back in the U.S. The 
pro-German President Venustiano Carranza, who had ordered 
Zapata's assassination, was now dead, assassinated in 1920 
as he fled to exile. Positive accounts of the 
administrations of Obregon and Calles by writers such as 
Gruening and Tannenbaum sparked interest in visiting Mexico 
and by the beginning of the 1930s, U.S. citizens were
• • • » * 103vacationing in Mexico, in record numbers. These travelers 
brought back favorable reports of the interesting people and 
culture to be found.
The 1930s and 1940s saw a dramatic rehabilitation of 
Zapata's reputation in the United States. The U.S. media, 
government, and residents of Mexico, groups who earlier had
103 a ,  ,Zoraida and Meyer, The United States and Mexico, 144.
56
57
been at pains to vilify Zapata, began to represent him in an 
almost heroic light. There were no new sources of 
information on Zapata discovered at the time to provoke this 
reevaluation. Gildardo and Octavio Magana still privately 
held all of the main body of papers that eventually became
1 DAthe Archivo de Zapata. Rather, this reinterpretation of 
Zapata and its general acceptance reflected a fundamental 
change in the U.S. perception of Latin America and the U.S. 
role there. Before the early 193 0s, Latin America, 
particularly Mexico, had been a place to exploit, a place to 
go and get rich in oil or agriculture or mining. It was a 
place where white U.S. citizens could have a houseful of 
Indian servants and a sense of superiority, even if back 
home they were "nobody.” The rise of fascism and the 
Depression changed all that.
In 1933, the Roosevelt administration initiated the 
Good Neighbor Policy and the U.S. supported the principles 
of nonintervention and collective action at the Seventh 
Conference of American States in Montevideo. This action, 
unthinkable policy a decade previously, was motivated by the 
U.S. need to assure a united inter-American front against 
German and Japanese expansionism. The perception of Latin 
America as an adjunct to the U.S. had not changed, but it 
was no longer our private sphere of influence to be
104 Womack, Revolution, 414.
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exploited. Now Latin America seemed to Roosevelt to be a 
long flank dangerously exposed to the threat of fascism.
New, positive symbols of Latin America, such as Emiliano 
Zapata, had to be created to bind that flank within our 
protective circle.
By the early 193 0s too, the U.S. had lost some of its 
faith in its inherent superiority over Latin America. The 
Depression left some, now in doubt about the "blessings" of 
technology and progress, nostalgic for simpler times. 
Interest in and approval of the "primitive" was reflected in 
works like Oswald Spengler's Decline of the West.105 As an 
"Indian," Zapata came in for a reinterpretation. Several 
new books appeared, by people who had been present during 
the 1910-1920 revolution, which offered a new slant on 
Zapata's role and importance. The more positive portraits 
of Zapata in these works paved the way for "official" U.S. 
attempts to coopt Zapata as a symbol in the 1940s.
Leone B. Moats went to Mexico as the young bride of a 
wealthy man, and at the writing in 193 2 of Thunder In Their 
Veins, her memoir, she had lived in Mexico for over twenty 
years. Moats wrote that Zapata was no bandit. She believed 
that he was sincere in his call for agrarian reform, even if 
she did not completely understand what it was he wanted to 
accomplish when she labelled him "a sort of village
10*5 Keen, Aztec Image, 463-64.
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• 106Bolshevik.11 Zapata remained true to his cause, Tierra y
Libertad, and "He would fight for any one who promised that,
then fight against them when, in power, they reneged.11107
As Carleton Beals pointed out in his scathing review of
Thunder In Their Veins, Moats was not without her biases and
shortcomings, including hearty praise of the Porfiriato.
While she personally admired and respected Zapata, she also
found the Zapatista soldiers rather laughable as a fighting
force. Hardly ever mentioning harsh threats or severe
raids, Moats described at length practical jokes involving
Zapatistas, either as the pranksters or as the butt of them.
In these memoirs, she painted a picture of Zapata as a
country man, uncomfortable with the city and its manners,
but said he had "the hill man's native sagacity"108 and his
followers a "rural naivete and honesty of demeanor."109 In
her view, these men held a spiritual superiority over
"modern" men of the cities;
They do not live to be very old. The hot chile food 
and the exposure soon kills them off. Poor wretches! 
But then they seem so happy and contented. They want 
nothing. They are not eaten with ambition . . . Are
106 * •Leone B. Moats, Thunder In Their Veins: A Memoir of
Mexico, ed. Russell Lord (New York: The Century Co., 1932),
82.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid., 151.
109 Ibid., 84.
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these Indians wise, and we the shallow and defeated, 
for all our striving?110
Due to the new attitude toward Mexico and the new 
appreciation of the "primitive,11 Moats1 book was, barring 
Beals, well-received in the U.S. So, too, was Tempest Over 
Mexico (1935), the work of another foreign resident of 
Mexico, Englishwoman Rosa E. King. Although at the time of 
the 1910-1920 revolution King supported the Mexican federal 
government and feared and hated Zapata and his "bandit 
horde," looking back, she expressed doubts about her earlier 
beliefs. She wrote that after the break between Zapata and 
Madero in 1911, she had thought that the Zapatistas were 
"harmless and valiant children" exhibiting a "burst of 
destructiveness <that> seemed to me a childish reaction to 
the slight they had suffered," but that she now realized 
that Zapata was passionately committed to his ideal of land 
reform and he knew that Madero*s choice of Ambrosio Figueroa 
as governor of Morelos would block the agrarian program.111 
King also changed her mind about federal soldiers who 
defected to the Zapatistas during a seige of Cuernavaca, 
saying she could now respect their decision to abandon the
110 Ibid. , 39.
111 Rosa E. King, Tempest Over Mexico (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1935), 76-77.
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murdering dictator Huerta and serve Zapata, who remained
"true as steel to the Revolution.1,112
Like Leone Moats, Rosa King praised the "primitive"
qualities of the Zapatistas. She described the peaceful
Zapatista occupation of Mexico City, which she lived
through, noting that the "modern" city residents laughed at
Zapata’s followers for asking for tortillas instead of fancy
city food. She wrote, "I was sure that they must have
laughed in their turn at the soft city folks who could not
understand anything outside their own way of doing
things."113 King expressed admiration of Zapata's decision
not to take the Presidency in 1915, not because she thought
him evil or stupid, but because he was smart enough to know
his support and strength came from his roots in Morelos:
It was, I sensed, the essence of their trust in 
Zapata that he stayed close to the soil of his tierra,
whose needs were part of him; eschewing honors and
wealth . . .  114
Tempest Over Mexico won uniformly positive reviews in the
U.S. press. The tone of King's book was one of reevaluation
that mirrored the 1930s. Mexico was now a neighbor, not an
unruly child, and King's new respect for Zapata fit in with
this new perception.
112 Ibid. , 180—81.
113 Ibid. , 275.
114 Ibid., 294.
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The extent to which this reevaluation of Zapata took 
hold shows in the reactions of the reviewers to the first 
Zapata biography, Harry H. Dunn’s The Crimson Jester:
Zapata of Mexico (1933). Dunn was a correspondent in Mexico 
for the International News Service and the National News 
Association. He claimed to have ridden with the Zapatistas 
and personally interviewed Zapata many times. This, 
however, is highly questionable since there is no mention of 
Dunn's association with Zapata in any other record of the 
Morelos revolution and, as Dunn himself admitted, he was 
expelled from Mexico in late 1912.115 Another clue that 
Dunn's imagination carried his book farther than his 
experience is in a photograph in his book captioned, "The 
Zapata brothers and the author on a secret mission to 
Veracruz, during American intervention, 1914," showing 
Emiliano, Eufemio, and Dunn standing together in the jungle. 
Comparison of this photo, however, with one credited to the 
Archivo Casasola appearing in the 1969 Zapata and the 
Mexican Revolution captioned "Eufemio and Emiliano Zapata, 
1911," suggests that Dunn's photo is the product of some 
clever work with scissors, not a camera. Dunn admitted in 
the book that several others of his illustrating photographs 
were actually composites. It seems much more likely that 
Dunn added himself to the photograph, producing the single
115 Womack, Revolution, 422.
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piece of hard evidence in support of his story, than the
idea that the highly reputable Archivo Casasola cut him out.
Dunn seems to have been influenced by the April 1916
"William O fHara" story in the New York Times Magazine of a
journalist's adventures riding with the Zapatistas and
interviewing Zapata. Dunn is also the only other writer to
use O'Hara's term "Death Legion" to describe Zapata's
personal troops.
In The Crimson Jester Dunn presented Zapata as an
illiterate, but cunning, bandit with a wicked sense of humor
displayed in frequent, and deadly, "practical jokes." Dunn
used the image of a cobra to describe Zapata, calling him
"fearless, implacable, deadly, the only American reptile
that carries the fight to man whenever and wherever it finds 
• 116him." Dunn called the Plan de Ayala a "savage Bill of 
Rights" and maintained that it was concocted only as window 
dressing for Zapata's bandit activities and to support his 
final goal:
. . . the return of all the land to all the Indians.
In a word, the ultimate plan of Emiliano Zapata was the 
restoration of the wild, laborless, carefree life they 
had lived for centuries to the Indios puros . . .  He 
and his brown-skinned followers were seeking to
• * 1 1 7reestablish the earthly Happy Hunting Grounds . . .
116 Harry H. Dunn, The Crimson Jester: Zapata of Mexico
(New York: The National Travel Club, 1934), 32.
117 Ibid. , 26.
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Dunn's biography of Zapata was also heavily laden down with
his virulent racism. As the Zapatistas attacked the Morelos
town of Yautepec, their supposed war cry was "Death to the 
• 118Whites!" Dunn's description of Francisco Villa also
illustrates this point:
He was simply a fat, child-minded, mixed border bully. 
Unarmed, he would have been undressed and afraid. The 
negro blood in him whimpered of servility to a white 
man . . .119
While the reaction to The Crimson Jester was hardly 
resounding condemnation, reviewers would no longer swallow 
whole the story of Zapata as the "Attila of the South." In 
the New Republic Carleton Beals wrote, "Zapata was no angel. 
But . . . the legitimate General Pablo Gonzalez probably
laid the state of Morelos more waste than all Zapata's
• , 120 , campaigning." The Saturday Review of Literature said:
Much of his narrative, detached from the purple 
verbiage in which all of it is couched, is doubtless 
fact. But no reader can be asked to accept seriously, 
either as history or biography, a story so persistently 
and luridly melodramatic.121
118 Ibid. , 50.
119 Ibid. , 236.
120 • (Carleton Beals, review of The Crimson Jester:
Zapata of Mexico, by Harry H. Dunn, New Republic, 18 October 
1933, 286.
121 • , •Review of The Crimson Jester: Zapata of Mexico, by
Harry H. Dunn, Saturday Review of Literature, 16 September
1933, 118.
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Even the New York Times, which had put out O'Hara's story as 
absolute truth, now called Zapata "a killer, but he killed
• • a 122to right wrongs that were often confoundmgly valid."
By the end of the 1930s, the new attitude was firmly in 
place. Latin Americans were to be fellow democrats in the 
coming war against expanding fascism. When President 
Cardenas nationalized the Mexican oil industries in 1938, as 
a result primarily of the recalcitrance of the U.S. 
companies on labor matters, President Roosevelt refused to 
consider the oilmen's demands for reprisals. In the 1940s 
Zapata became part of a new pantheon of Mexican "heroes," 
including Benito Juarez and Lazaro Cardenas, created by 
journalists, authors, and government officials to introduce 
U.S. citizens to our new neighbors and prove to the 
neighbors that we were not so bad to live next door to. Of 
course, many of these new, more flattering portrayals failed 
to accurately represent Zapata and his movement, just as the 
old "Attila of the South" materials did. Old dollar 
diplomatists had made Zapata into a marauding bandit. The 
new Zapata stories, just like the old ones, were created to 
support the current thinking about the role the U.S. should 
play in Latin America.
122 • •C.G. Poore, review of The Crimson Jester: Zapata of
Mexico, by Harry H. Dunn, New York Times Book Review, 3
September 1933, 5.
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After Harry Dunn's pathetic joke of a book came out in 
1934, Zapata was not again the subject of a biography until 
Edgcumb Pinchon1s 1941 work, Zapata the Unconquerable. 
Pinchon, the author of an earlier work rehabilitating 
Francisco Villa, was partially motivated by a desire to 
debunk Dunn's Crimson Jester. Pinchon wrote that he had 
personally talked to five Zapatistas including Magana and 
Diaz Soto y Gama and that they all denied Dunn ever having 
had contact with the Zapatista camp. Although the book 
claimed to be only a historical novel, it was the product of 
Pinchon's reading the works on Zapata by Octavio Paz and 
Gildardo Magana, the "brotherly aid" of Antonio Diaz Soto y 
Gama, the reminiscences of Zapata's secretario particular, 
Colonel Serafin Robles, and a year of "field research" in
123Morelos. The book certainly used some novelistic 
techniques such as dramatic language, descriptions of 
persons' inner feelings and some fictional characters and 
scenes. Pinchon also subscribed to a distasteful anti­
semitism, which was not unusual for an Englishman of his 
day, but did weaken his credibility. He consistently 
referred to Madero as "the little Jewish upstart." Despite 
this, Pinchon had a clear understanding of the Plan de Ayala 
and Zapata's role in the big picture of the Revolution which 
helped Pinchon accomplish the task he set for himself,
123 •Edgcumb Pinchon, Zapata The Unconquerable (New York: 
Doubleday, Doran and Co., 1941), v.
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11. . .to rescue from the back of a mule where once it hung,
bodiless and bloody the head of one of the greatest human
1 7Abeings of modern times."
Pinchon was obviously influenced by his times. Zapata 
The Unconquerable, is spiced with references to "blitzkrieg" 
and the "fascist phalange." He had very definite ideas as 
to the use of his story of Zapata. In 1938, as he was 
starting the novel, Pinchon approached Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
studios in Hollywood with an offer of screen rights to his 
forthcoming book. From the beginning of their association, 
Pinchon saw a Zapata movie as a propaganda vehicle. He 
wrote:
The World is teetering between the enticements of 
dictatorship and democracy. Show in the film a 
dictatorship at work. . . . Show what happened— the
final, mad desperate, heroic revolt. Then show the 
denouement— peace and home and happiness, freedom to be 
a man, go one's own way and speak one's mind. . . .
Show that— and you have . . .  a world document of
• 9 175immense preachment at this moment.
MGM bought the rights and Pinchon wrote his book, but movie 
plans were derailed by the outbreak of World War II.
U.S. journalist Betty Kirk did her share, too, to 
enlist Zapata in the war on fascism. Kirk covered Mexico 
for most of the Cardenas administration and the elections
124 Ibid., viii.
175 • , ,Paul J. Vanderwood, "An American Cold Warrior: Viva
Zapata!," in American History/American Film, ed. John E. 
O'Connor and Martin A. Jackson (New York: Frederick Ungar
Publishing Co., 1979), 185.
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that put Avila Camacho in the presidency in 1940. In 1942, 
she wrote a book analyzing the current state of Mexico 
titled, Covering the Mexican Front: The Battle of Europe
versus America. Fascism, she wrote, was making dangerous 
inroads in Mexico. This European ideology was fighting to 
take root in the soil of the Americas. Kirk was extremely 
impressed with President Lazaro Cardenas. She applauded his 
efforts at land reform and his battle against "fascist" 
uprisings such as Saturnino Cedillo's. Her respect for 
Cardenas* land reform led her to investigate Zapata and she 
found much to praise. Turning what had previously been held 
against Zapata into a virtue, she called him a visionary
saying, "Zapata knew that the old world had to be destroyed
126before the new world could be built." She defended both
Cardenas and Zapata against charges of communism by noting
that Zapata started his revolution well before the 1917
Russian Revolution and that division of the land in Mexico
was a return to a "native" system of landholding centuries
older than communism. Zapata was actually a savior, not
despoiler, of Mexico:
It has been a revelation to see Mexico's rebirth from 
the soil, made possible by land division and 
collectivization on the principle of "The land belongs 
to him who works it" <a saying Kirk attributes to
126 Betty Kirk, Covering The Mexican Front: The Battle
of Europe versus America (Norman, Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1942), 106.
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Zapata>. There have been two heroes of this 
renaissance. The first was Emiliano Zapata.127
It was the work of Zapata that made possible Cardenas*
presidency. Kirk wrote, "Before the realist can act the
dreamer must give him a vision for his deeds."128
Both Pinchon and Kirk explicitly created a Latin
American hero who fought for the same goals as the U.S.
Both praised Zapata in an effort to create common ground
between the U.S. and Latin Americans. The man who resorted
to violence to protect his rights from exploitation
certainly could no longer be considered just a marauding
bandit when thousands of U.S. men were in arms around the
world in defense of democracy. Especially when those men
needed the support of the rich resources of Latin America.
127 Ibid., 107.
128 Ibid., 80.
CHAPTER IV
THE SHARPEST WEAPONS OF ALL
After the war, the enemy became communism instead of
fascism, but the concept of the U.S. role as protector in
Latin America remained the same. Actually this role
expanded to include much of the developing world. We must
protect ourselves from the "red scourge,11 and convince
others to put themselves under our protection, too. More
than ever, the U.S. needed to create "heroes” from Latin
America to tie us together in the fight against tyranny.
The history of the 1952 movie Viva Zapata! clearly
illustrates the most elaborate U.S. attempt to coopt Zapata.
In June of 1945, while in Cuernavaca working on the
script for The Pearl, John Steinbeck wrote to his literary
agents that he was interested in writing a movie about
Emiliano Zapata:
I would only make it straight. I would reguire gov't 
(sic) assurance that it could be made straight 
historically. This will have to be an iron bound 
agreement because Zapata could be one of the great 
films of all time as by a twist or a concession it
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could be a complete double cross of the things Zapata
lived and died for.129
The movie, Viva Zapata!, was eventually made and released 
in 1952, but unfortunately reflected the past history of the 
project in Hollywood as a potential propaganda vehicle, 
precious little of Steinbeck*s original intentions for a 
"straight11 movie about the Mexican revolutionary and his 
movement, and the Cold War tensions of the early 1950s. In 
its final form the movie was an attempt, in the words of one 
reviewer, "to represent Zapata's simple cause, Tierra y 
Libertad, in terms of present-day cliches about democracy
• 9 1 3 0  •and dictatorship.” It was a gross mismatch between 
vehicle and theme.
Hollywood's interest in a Zapata movie had always been 
motivated by a desire to use his story as a frame on which 
to nail a none-too-subtle political message. Pinchon's 
efforts were only the first. During the war the U.S. 
government's Office for Co-ordination of Commercial and 
Cultural Relations between the American Republics, 
responsible for squelching Axis propaganda in Latin America 
and spreading U.S. propaganda, asked Addison Durland of the 
Motion Picture Producers Association to investigate the
129 , , ,John Steinbeck, Steinbeck: A Life In Letters, ed.
Elaine Steinbeck and Robert Wallsten (New York: Viking
Press, 1975), 282.
130 g g «Catherine de la Roche, review of Viva Zapata!, by 
John Steinbeck, Sight and Sound, April-June 1952, 4.
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possibility of using the story of Zapata as a vehicle for 
the Office*s message. Durland, however, concluded that the 
conflicting images of Zapata in the minds of Latin Americans 
and the difficulties of maintaining historical accuracy
• • « # 131would make it impossible to produce a useful movie.
Unlike the Hollywood establishment, Steinbeck*s 
original motivations to do a Zapata movie were intensely 
personal. Steinbeck began the project in an acute state of 
mental distress. His closest friend, scientist Edward 
Ricketts, died in a car accident in May 1948. As Steinbeck 
wrote to another friend, Swedish artist Bo Beskow, he was 
starting on the Zapata script because, "Resting I could not 
do. I need violent work, and violent play, and I am going
132to have both." In addition to this, his second marriage,
to Gwendolyn Conger, was disintegrating and in August 1948
she filed for divorce. After a November visit with
Steinbeck, Annie Laurie Williams, an old friend and his
literary agent, wrote:
He is deeply disturbed and frightened about his work.
If it doesn*t go well in Mexico <where Steinbeck was 
going to work on the script> I honestly don't know what 
will happen.133
131 * •Vanderwood, American Cold Warrior, 186.
132 Steinbeck, Letters, 318.
133 Ibid., 3 39.
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It did not "go well" in Mexico and the Zapata script
17A"went to pieces" , but by the spring of 1949 life was again 
looking up for Steinbeck. He looked forward to the summer 
visit of his two sons, who he missed intensely, and had 
begun an affair with Elaine Scott (wife of actress Zachary 
Scott) who would soon become his third wife. At the end of 
the summer he began again and by November had produced a 
complete first draft.
Except for the fact that both this script and the 1952 
movie were about Emiliano Zapata, they had almost nothing in 
common. The main theme of the 194 9 script was "Can social 
change be accomplished through violence and what 
responsibility does the leader of a violent revolution bear 
to his followers and to his society?" The story of the 
Zapatista movement is relevant to an examination of this 
question. Zapata led a social revolution, and the resulting 
violence had devastating effects on the people of Morelos.
Throughout this first script, Zapata wrestles with 
these issues. When the villagers, led by Zapata, attempt to 
locate their boundary stone, which has been fenced in by the 
neighboring hacienda, the Rurales open fire on them with 
machine guns and many villagers are killed. Zapata must 
flee to the mountains as an outlaw where he is found by 
Pablo, an emissary from Francisco Madero. Pablo wants
134 Ibid., 345.
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Zapata to join the revolution, but Zapata refuses, saying,
"I tried these things. Because of my planning many people 
who might still have been living are dead —  and I was the
• 135 • •cause of their deaths." He attempts to reject violent
methods and accepts the pardon and job offered by Don Nacio,
a liberal-minded hacendado. Don Nacio tells him:
Emiliano, I understand you. I know that your intention 
was good, but what you did was bad. Changes must come, 
but they must be slow. Violence will bring only pain 
to your people and death to yourself.136
However, after seeing a poor little girl beaten for eating
some of a horse's food and a peon dragged to death behind
the horse of a Rurale, Zapata realizes he must fight fire
with fire to achieve his goals of Tierra y Libertad.
Although he has accepted the need for violence, Zapata
still questions the extent of his responsibility to his
society. As they ride through the ruins of Don Nacio's
hacienda and their home village Zapata and his brother
Eufemio discuss it. Eufemio wants to leave Morelos with
Emiliano, "Then we could have some peace, and there might be
137 , , fpeace here," but when Emiliano tells him to go on alone 
Eufemio refuses to leave him. In spite of the devastation,
135 John Steinbeck, "Zapata," Draft of script, 26 
November 1949, Papers of John Steinbeck, The Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center, The University of Texas at 
Austin, Austin, Texas, 41.
136 Ibid., 52.
137 Ibid. , 137.
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his brother is more important than any sort of "peace.” 
Zapata finds his wife Josefa hiding in the burned out shell 
of her father’s home. He asks her if she wants him to stop 
fighting. She asks, "Would there be peace Emiliano?" and he 
replies:
I don't know. Maybe. But it would be peace with our 
people beaten and hopeless, with no heart to fight 
against anything anymore.
Making "peace" with the federal government at this point
would be to forfeit any chance of achieving social change.
In the end, just before Zapata goes to meet his death
at Chinameca, he visits Don Nacio, who is now held in
Zapata's protective custody. Don Nacio tells Zapata he
realizes that Zapata was right, that violence is the only
way to achieve justice for the people. Throughout
Anencuilco people are rebuilding their homes and replanting
their fields. Zapata tells one man to make sure he has
built a safe place to hide a gun in his house because, "The
land laws aren't passed yet. The wolves aren't dead.
You'll only have it <the land> as long as you're willing to
fight for it."139
The 1949 script concluded that social change could be
achieved through violent revolution. Although this demanded
a stiff price in terms of human suffering, Zapata, as the
138 Ibid., 140.
139 Ibid., 157.
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leader of such a revolution could still be considered a 
"good man," as long as he remained uncorrupted, because he 
taught the people to be strong and demand their rights. Don 
Nacio says:
. . . Just as a man may rise from a chair because a
single nerve twitches on his body, so perhaps is 
progress in the world stimulated by aching Emilianos.
I know this now. And so I think you are a good
man. . . The new armies <Carranza's> will not find the
same kind of people they used to.140
What had begun as an intensely personal project, born 
of Steinbeck*s admiration for Zapata and the chaos of the 
writer's private life, soon collided with the atmosphere of 
hysteria and suspicion that characterized the post-war U.S. 
In 1947, MGM producer Jack Cummings and screenwriter Lester 
Cole revived the idea of a Zapata film, created a script, 
and secured the approval of the Mexican government. Had 
this movie been made, it may or may not have coopted Zapata 
as a symbol for any particular agenda. Cole, however, was 
subpoenaed by the House Un-American Activities Committee and 
became one of the blacklisted "Hollywood Ten." MGM, whose 
general manager Eddie Mannix had once said, upon seeing 
Cole's work, "Get rid of this f------ script, this bastard
1L. 1Zapata's a goddam commie revolutionary," sold the rights
140 Ibid., 160.
141 Peter Biskind, "Ripping Off Zapata— Revolution 
Hollywood Style," review of Viva Zapata!, by John Steinbeck, 
Cineaste, April 197 6, 14.
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to the Zapata story to Twentieth Century Fox for $60,000.142
It was Fox that hired John Steinbeck to write the screenplay
and Elia Kazan to direct.
Through 1950 Steinbeck polished and tightened the
script until he had what he called "a little double action
jewel of a script . . .  a classic example of good film 
1writing." Fox producer Darryl Zanuck was not as sure.
With a weather eye on the HUAC he decided to sanitize
Zapata's message:
Certainly it isn't communism, and we want to make this 
very clear because, frankly, in the present script 
there is inadvertently a peculiar air about certain 
speeches which might be interpreted by the Communists 
to claim that we are subtly working for them. . . .  It 
seems to me that Zapata has a pretty good pattern for a 
democratic government in his neighbor, the United 
States —  only one civil war in 170 years. I am sure 
that Zapata must have asked the question many times: 
'How do they do it in the United States?'144
The switch to the theme of democracy vs. communism may
have been politically safe and sound at the time (and is
certainly a legitimate issue to be explored in films), but
it wreaked havoc on Steinbeck's script. By the time it had
been reworked to the point that the action and dialogue
effectively reflected the desired thesis, the script no
longer came even close to reflecting the life and times of
142 Vanderwood, American Cold Warrior, 188.
143 Steinbeck, Letters, 4 07.
144 Vanderwood, American Cold Warrior, 191.
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Emiliano Zapata in the "straight" manner Steinbeck had 
originally insisted on.
Any of Zapata’s actions that could be construed as
"communist" had to be purged from the movie. In the 1949
version Zapata and Villa discussed the possibility of one of 
them becoming President of Mexico. Villa rejected the post 
because he wanted to retire to his ranch in Chihuahua and 
Zapata felt that he himself did not have the experience or 
education to be president and that his place was in Morelos 
working for land reform. They then both pulled their armies 
out of Mexico City and returned home to work on their 
separate local goals. By 1952, this scene had gone from 
Zapata’s realistic appraisal of his somewhat tenuous
position in Mexico City to a grand, idealistic renunciation
of evilly corrupting power as Zapata finds himself circling 
the name on a list of petitioners of a young man who has 
come to protest Eufemio1s takeover of a hacienda that had 
been distributed among a group of peones. Zapata realizes 
that the gesture is identical to Diaz circling Zapata's name 
on a list of protesting villagers at the beginning of the 
movie. He immediately rejects his position and prepares to 
return to Morelos. When told, "Thousands of men have died 
to give you power and you're throwing it away," Zapata 
replies, "I'm taking it back where it belongs? to thousands
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of men."145 As Kazan said, "No Communist, no totalitarian, 
ever refused power. By showing that Zapata did this, we 
spoiled a poster figure that the Communists have been at
1 Lf%some pains to create." Of course, as Carleton Beals 
rightly pointed out at the time and John Womack later 
confirmed in great detail, Zapata never had power to 
renounce.
In his 1949 draft Steinbeck never hesitated to show the
devastation of the people and the country that was a result
of the violent social revolution. He also emphasized,
however, the rebirth of Morelos and its people as they won
each victory. When Zapata returns from Mexico City he leads
the Morelenses in rebuilding their homes, replanting their
fields, and recovering their boundary stone. Steinbeck left
the last scene unwritten in this draft, except for a note:
The required scene will show very quickly countryside 
being brought to fruitfulness. It will indicate that 
Zapata did not live and die in vain. I will discuss 
this scene with the director <Kazan> before writing 
it.147
In the 1952 version Zapata is stripped of his role as a 
builder, so that the movie would not seem to be advocating 
the "communist" tactic of civil war as a means to social
1 A1? John Steinbeck, Viva Zapata!: The Original
Screenplay by John Steinbeck, ed. Robert E. Morsberger (New 
York: Viking Press, 1975), 102.
146 Elia Kazan, "Elia Kazan On ’Zapata,*" Saturday 
Review of Literature, 5 April 1952, 22.
147 Steinbeck, "Zapata," 175.
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justice. Just before Zapata executes Pablo, his long-time
compatriot, for the "treasonous" act of attempting a
reconciliation with Madero, a scene not in the 1949 script,
Pablo praises Madero:
He was a good man, Emiliano. He wanted to build houses 
and plant fields. And he was right. If we could begin 
to build —  even while the burning goes on. If we 
could plant while we destroy . . .14
In fact, Madero was quickly coopted, once he became
president, by his fellow hacendados and Porfirians who felt
the Morelenses needed discipline, not land reform. It was
Madero who sent in General Juvencio Robles to pacify
Morelos. Robles took as hostages four women from Zapata’s
family, rounded up much of the population into
"concentration camps" and burned the emptied villages to
keep them from becoming Zapatista strongholds.149
The cold, power-hungry, intellectual revolutionary
Fernando Aguirre was added to the script as a representative
of what Kazan called the "Communist mentality":
He typifies the men who use the just grievances of the 
people for their own ends, who shift and twist their 
course, betray any friend or principle or promise to 
get power and keep it.150
It is Fernando who goads Zapata into executing Pablo, it is
Fernando who begs Zapata not to throw away his "power" in
148 Steinbeck, Viva Zapata/, 86.
1&0 *Womack, Revolution, 138-39.
150 Kazan, "Elia Kazan on ’Zapata,1" 22-23.
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Mexico City, and it is Fernando who ultimately defects to
the Carrancistas and organizes Zapata*s assassination. The
1949 script did not make any reference to Zapata*s possible
illiteracy, but by 1952 Steinbeck had added a scene where
Zapata begs his new wife to teach him to read. At several
points in the 1952 script Fernando has to correct or advise
Zapata on points of strategy that in the earlier draft
Zapata had figured out for himself. Steinbeck had long
distrusted intellectual politicos of this type. In a 1935
letter to his literary agent concerning criticism of In
Dubious Battle he wrote:
. . . the reasons given against the book are all those
I have heard from communists of the intellectual bent 
and of the Jewish race. . . .  My information for this 
book came mostly from Irish and Italian communists 
whose training was in the field, not in the drawing 
room. They don't believe in ideologies and ideal 
tactics.151
A "communist" character such as Fernando is ridiculously out 
of place in the Zapata story. At that time there was no 
communist party to speak of in Mexico, and certainly not in 
the mountains of Morelos. The "intellectuals" of the 
Zapatista movement were Antonio Diaz Soto y Gama, a liberal 
lawyer who had fled the Huerta government, Gildardo Magana, 
an sometime anarcho-syndicalist, and Otilio Montano, a 
schoolteacher from Villa de Ayala. Most recent scholarship 
suggests that the Plan de Ayala, the manifesto of Zapatismo,
151 Steinbeck, Letters, 109.
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was written by Zapata and Montano. As Carleton Beals noted, 
"I have known nearly all the Mexican intellectuals, honest 
or dishonest, who attached themselves to this or that armed
152leader, and Fernando corresponds to none of them."
The new democracy vs. communism thesis shifted the 
film's interpretation of Zapata almost a full 180 degrees. 
Instead of the responsible, intelligent leader of a largely 
successful revolution, he became a reluctant, manipulated 
leader of a violent outburst that must fail in its goal of 
social justice. Zapata goes from strong revolutionary 
leader to confused democrat.
The question must be asked, "How could Steinbeck have 
allowed such tampering with his 'jewel'?" Zanuck and 
Kazan's motivations for imposing the democracy vs. communism 
thesis on Viva Zapata! are fairly clear. Kazan had been 
active in left-wing theater during the 193 0s and was a 
member of the U.S. communist party from 1934 to 193 6, when 
he became disillusioned with Stalin. He knew he might be 
called to testify before the HUAC , where his work would 
surely be examined. Zanuck also had no desire to join with 
the "Hollywood Ten" and was mainly concerned with "questions 
concerning content, financial.potential, possible public
• • • o 153criticism, and McCarthyite pressures."
152 a •Carleton Beals, "'Zapata' Again," Saturday Review of 
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Steinbeck had not always been a rabid anti-communist.
Back in 1935 he wrote:
That is the trouble with the damned people of both 
sides. They postulate either an ideal communist or a 
thoroughly damnable communist and neither side is 
willing to suspect that the communist is a human, 
subject to the weaknesses of humans and to the 
greatness of humans.154
He was deeply disturbed, however, by his 1947 visit to the
Soviet Union. He and photographer Robert Capa had gone to
the U.S.S.R. for the New York Herald Tribune. He liked the
country farmers and workers he met, but found Moscow
depressing, "after a while the lack of laughter gets under
• 155 •your skin . . . "  To Steinbeck the worst part was the
heavy restrictions being placed on artists, writers, and
thinkers. As a writer whose own works, such as In Dubious
Battle and The Grapes of Wrath, had been heavily criticized
for their political content, the policies of the Soviet
government hit too close to home. He wrote to Bo Beskow:
I have been horrified at the creeping paralysis that is 
coming out of the Kremlin, the death of art and 
thought, the death of individuals and the only creative 
thing in the world is the individual. . . . God knows 
you and we are far from perfect but we are far better 
than that.156
Steinbeck did not just sit back passively and let Kazan 
and Zanuck alter the script. He had been converted to their
154 Steinbeck, Letters, 108.
155 9 9 9Steinbeck, Viva Zapata!, xxxi.
156 Steinbeck, Letters, 403.
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point of view. At a conference with Mexican film officials 
in Cuernavaca, according to Kazan, in the face of the 
officials' strenuous objections to the revised script, "John
• • 157said, 'I smell the Party line.'" Later, when Kazan chose 
to "name names" for the HUAC, Steinbeck was very supportive. 
In a letter Steinbeck mentioned that Kazan had sent him a
copy of the statement he had made to the Committee, "which I
thought good. It must be a very hard decision to make. . .
. I hope the Communists and the second raters don't cut him 
to pieces now."158
Steinbeck's change of heart was short-lived. Although 
he praised Kazan's decision to name names for the committee 
in 1952, in a April 1957 letter to Esquire magazine he 
strongly attacked the committee for its grilling of Arthur 
Miller. As he told Covici, "It should have been said a long
• 159 • • ■ •time ago." A month later Steinbeck wrote Covici saying
that U.S. writers had been like rabbits and that it was time
to stand up as Edward R. Murrow had done. "You see, we
<writers> have had all along the sharpest weapons of all,
• 160 words, and we did not use them, and I for one am ashamed."
157 Kazan, "Elia Kazan on 'Zapata,'" 22-23.
158 Steinbeck, Letters, 443.
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John Steinbeck originally saw Zapata as a great man, a 
strong, responsible leader, and chief of a violent, but 
progressive revolution. The influence of Darryl Zanuck and 
Elia Kazan, Steinbeck's response to the fate of his fellow 
artists in the Soviet Union, and the tense political 
atmosphere at home encouraged Steinbeck to mold Zapata into 
a usable symbol in the war on communism. As much of the 
critical response to the movie pointed out, the message and 
the man were extremely ill-fitted for each other.
CHAPTER V
A GREAT GUERRILLA WARRIOR
By the end of Viva Zapata!'s run, it was clear that 
Zapata would no longer serve as a symbol useful to Cold 
Warriors anxious to sign up Latin Americans for the good 
fight. In fact, the U.S. government feared that, despite 
our "neighborliness" parts of Latin America had already 
slipped into the enemy camp. Stronger measures were in 
order, measures like the 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz in 
Guatemala and the 19 61 Bay of Pigs invasion. These actions 
stirred up opposition at home and abroad, and the proper 
role of the U.S. in Latin America, and the rest of the 
developing world, was argued with more passion than ever 
before.
Was violence a legitimate way to gain social justice? 
This was the question many thinking men and women asked 
themselves as the globe exploded in violent protest, 
revolutionary uprisings, and guerrilla warfare. If not, 
then did not the U.S., as a powerful nation, have an 
obligation to "police" the world? Were not the leaders of 
violent social revolutions men to be condemned? This was 
the position taken by the U.S. government. What if,
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however, the violent revolutionary was a man or woman trying 
simply to gain social justice for their people in the only 
way possible?" Then what was the proper U.S. role? Was it 
not a violation of our own standards of freedom and 
democracy to support Batista and Somoza and the others?
Many who objected to U.S. adventures in Guatemala, Cuba, and 
elsewhere, tried to establish a historical precedent, to 
legitimate, and to analyze past successes of the guerrilla 
response. This led to studies of earlier social 
revolutionaries, including Emiliano Zapata.
Eric Hobsbawm set the stage with his analysis of rural 
protest in the form of social banditry. In Bandits (1969) 
he discussed this traditional form of protest and showed how 
it could evolve, as it did in the case of the Zapatistas, 
into a social revolution. Then came John Womack’s masterful 
study, Zapata and the Mexican Revolution (19 69). Womack was 
the first professional U.S* historian to devote his full 
attention to Zapata (Frank Tannenbaum at Columbia had only 
limited, scattered references in his works). Womack made 
full use of the newly available Archivo de Zapata and 
thoroughly searched the Mexican, as well as U.S., 
newspapers, government documents, and other primary 
materials. The Zapata that Womack discovered was no bandit, 
but he was no U.S.-style democrat either. First and 
foremost he was a man of his people, of Anencuilco, and of 
Morelos. He took to arms to demand a solution to the
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problems of his people, within the context of the local 
life. Zapatismo largely became entangled with the 
"national" revolution due to the proximity of Morelos to 
Mexico City and the Zapatista realization that active 
involvement would be the only way to guarantee the local 
revolution. When the choice had to be made, however, 
between the regional and national goals, Zapata withdrew to 
Morelos to assure the local revolution. Womack's Zapata was 
an honorable, intelligent man and a talented guerrilla 
leader, whose revolution ultimately met with a good measure 
of success. Womack's book touched off an explosion of 
interest in Zapata. Those who argued for support of violent 
social revolutions found in Zapata material to create a new 
hero.
The year 1969 saw the publication of Robert Millon's 
Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary. This book
came out as part of the New World Paperbacks series, which 
included, among other titles, The Autobiography of W.E.B. 
Dubois, Ten Days That Shook The World, Henry Winston's 
Strategy for a Black Agenda, and the works of Marx and 
Lenin. Millon tried to recreate Zapata as a communist 
revolutionary on the order of Lenin or Mao. He thoroughly 
refuted the idea that the Zapatistas fought only for their 
locality because they had a "circumscribed peasant outlook," 
and suggested that only a lack of arms prevented a farther-
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reaching field of battle.161 If Zapata had been a localist, 
Millon reasoned, then Zapata would have traded his 
retirement for reform in Morelos either with Huerta in 1913 
or Carranza in 1914. He did not deny that the Zapatistas 
stood first for agrarian reform, but insisted that they saw 
it as only the first step in a broader social, political, 
and economic revolution. Millon went to great lengths to 
prove that Zapata only failed to build a national base of 
support among groups other than peasants because city 
workers and the bourgeoisie had vested interests in keeping 
prices of food and raw materials low, which could only be
t ® o • • 162accomplished while the countryside was weak and divided.
Unfortunately for Millon, Zapata made no better 
communist revolutionary than he had democrat. While 
Millon1s arguments in favor of the intelligence of Zapata 
and his followers are convincing, he never covered the 
possibility that the Zapatistas were both smart and 
localists. For Millon, the only intelligent choice was a 
national revolution. As for trading his retirement for 
reform in Morelos either with Huerta in 1913 or Carranza in 
1914, once Zapata was betrayed by Madero he knew he could 
not trust the federal government to protect, or even allow,
161 •Robert P. Millon, Zapata: The Ideology of a Peasant
Revolutionary (New York: International Publishers Co.,
Inc., 1969), 88.
162 Ibid., 110.
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local reform, especially not so close to Mexico City.
Millon got much of his support for his belief in Zapata as a 
nationalist from documents of the Convention government in 
Cuernavaca. Naturally, these documents would take a 
broader, national view, since the Convention saw itself as 
the legitimate national government. It was not strictly the 
mouthpiece of Zapatismo, although Zapatistas were active in 
it. Zapata*s main use for the Convention was as a tool to 
support agrarian reform in Morelos. Zapata, if he truly was 
a nationalist, surely would have taken the presidency of the 
Convention. As for the urban "conspiracy” which kept Zapata 
from building national support, what Millon overlooked, of 
course, was the possibility that Zapata's program really was 
local in scope and appeal, and therefore unattractive to 
outsiders.
Millon's efforts, which the reviewers generally 
considered "small and lightweight"163 compared to Womack, 
were certainly not the last attempt to recreate Zapata as 
the patriarch of this century's revolutionary leaders. 
Forty-seven years after Mexico, An Interpretation, Carleton 
Beals took a second look at Emiliano Zapata with his 1970 
book Great Guerrilla Warriors. It was a much altered world 
in which Beals now wrote. The war to end all wars had
163 Charles C. Cumberland, review of Zapata: The
Ideology of a Peasant Revolutionary, by Robert P. Millon, In 
American Historical Review 75 (February 1970): 964.
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turned out to be only the first of many. China was "lost," 
Korea divided, Africa exploding, Vietnam struggling, and 
Latin America in the throes of revolution. The United 
States now played in much of the world the kind of role it 
had long held in Latin America, a role that Beals had long 
criticized. The United States' foreign policy was guided by 
the belief, as Frank Tannenbaum pointed out, that leaders 
who declared themselves anti-communist, by default 
represented democracy. Beals wrote Great Guerrilla Warriors 
in an attempt to describe the history of the guerrilla 
response and show that the issue of social revolutions was 
much more complicated than a simpleminded case of "democracy 
vs. communism."
Beals' position on Zapata in this book did not change 
so much as it expanded. He now identified Zapata as a 
guerrilla fighter. Not only did he feel Zapata was an 
important leader with legitimate goals within the Mexican 
Revolution, but Zapata was also identified as a leading 
figure in the history of twentieth century guerrilla 
movements worldwide. These movements have not been random 
outbursts of violence to satisfy the personal ambition of a 
few men. Beals suggested that this century's surge of 
guerrilla activity was due to a combination of "imperialism 
in its various aspects" and a revolution of rising 
expectations brought on by modern communications which
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highlighted the gross inequality of the majority of the
1AAdeveloping world's standard of living.
Beals tried to legitimate the guerrilla response by
establishing its "history" with a pantheon of heroes,
important victories, tragic defeats, and a continuity which
proved that these movements were not just random outbursts
of violence. Zapata, with other early leaders such as
Emilio Aquinaldo and Augusto Sandino, therefore set the
pattern for later guerrillas. Beals wrote:
The United States, with its maintenance of neo­
colonialism status quo and its policy of armed
intervention anywhere, has come to be considered a
chief offender <by guerrilla fighters of the 1960s>.
The early Mexican agrarian guerrilla leader Emiliano 
Zapata saw his enemy not merely as the Carranza 
government but also as the United States embassy."165
Quoting Zapata's speech on the day of Francisco Madero's
inauguration in which Zapata stated, "This same society that
today curses us for the 'crimes' which we commit to obtain
the resources to carry on our fight, will bless us," Beals
suggested that it "was the forerunner of Castro's 'History
• 166 Will Absolve Me' speech." To Beals, Zapata's work
definitely had an influence far beyond the mountains of
Morelos.
164 Carleton Beals, Great Guerrilla Warriors (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 4.
165 Ibid.
166 Ibid., 61.
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The passage of almost fifty years between the two books 
also allowed Beals to take a longer view of Zapata*s 
accomplishments. In 1923, Beals credited Zapata with 
forcing the inclusion of Article 27 into the 1917 
Constitution, though he had to admit that the article 
remained unenforced. By 197 0 he could see that the 
guerrilla*s victory was much more far-reaching and 
substantial. He observed, "In good part, the long struggles 
of Zapata and Villa ushered in a new and more just era of 
peace. In due time, the hoped-for great land reform was
« • 167carried out by President Lazaro Cardenas." For Beals, the 
history of Zapata made it clear that the U.S. must choose to 
support the social revolutions, rather than the "anti­
communist" entrenched heads of state, because the 
revolutions represented the groups that really stood for the 
"new and more just era of peace."
Interest in Zapata as a symbol for the revolutionary 
banner peaked in the mid-197 0s. In 1975, Roger Parkinson, a 
former war correspondent and a military historian, wrote 
Zapata. Among the several aspects of Zapata*s leadership, 
Parkinson quickly moved to point out Zapata*s "brilliance" 
in guerrilla warfare. He emphasized Zapata's use of his
knowledge of the terrain, his caution in picking and
choosing his engagements, and the organization and
167 Ibid. , 73.
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discipline of his army. High praise went to his ability to
outmaneuver General Victoriano Huerta in the Morelos
campaign of Fall 1911:
His army showed itself to be disciplined, and Zapata 
accomplished one of the most difficult military tasks 
for a leader of insurgent forces? he could detach 
sections of his army to undertake different duties, 
widely separated from each other, yet could retain 
cohesion for the conduct of his campaign as a whole. 
Operations in October 1911 form a classic example of 
the flexibility, rapidity, and decisiveness of first- 
class revolutionary tactics and strategy.168
Parkinson also stressed that a good portion of Zapata's
military success relied on another element of his
leadership: his close identification with his own campesino
origins and followers. The fact that Zapata continued
throughout his career to dress "as a typical village chief
• • « 1 ffiwearing his best clothes for the local fair" suggested 
that Zapata truly thought of himself as one of "the people," 
instead of a military ruler who should wear a general's gold 
braid and epaulets. Zapata knew that the campesinos were 
the strength of his army, both as fighters and as a combat- 
support network (commissary, transportation, intelligence), 
and he was careful not to alienate them, issuing orders for 
his soldiers to protect villagers and support them in their 
land claims. On no account were Zapatistas to loot, 
pillage, or terrorize the pueblos.
168 Roger Parkinson, Zapata (New York: Stein and Day, 
1975), 112.
169 Ibid., 59.
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Unfortunately, Parkinson then followed Millon into the 
"nationalist vs. regionalist" swamp. In order to draw 
completely the parallel between Zapata and the 
revolutionaries of the 1970s, Zapata had to be shown as a 
nationalist. Parkinson had no more luck than Millon. Both 
men were sidetracked by the language of the Plan de Ayala, 
which denounced Madero "for defaulting on his promises to 
the Mexican people,” and called for the overthrow of the 
federal government. What neither man took into account was 
that Zapata's antipathy toward the federal government 
stemmed from local causes, named in the Plan de Ayala as 
Madero's appointment of the anti-Zapatista Ambrosio Figueroa 
as governor of Morelos and the terror tactics of federal 
Generals Huerta, Robles, and Gonzalez within the state.
In a 1975 article for Mankind, a popular history 
magazine, Steve Ross steered clear of the "nationalist" 
argument, which could only be supported weakly, and 
concentrated on the common desperate economic conditions 
that motivated the Zapatistas and the social revolutionaries 
of the 197 0s. He described the struggle of the Zapatistas 
as the universal struggle between the "few 'haves' and the 
many 'have nots.'" He blamed the growing Morelos "sugar 
producing industry" for the usurpation of village lands 
which brought on the crisis:
Zapata and the natives of the State of Morelos were
fighting for their expropriated ancestral lands. They
96
were fighting the fight of a native people against
interlopers and exploiters . . .  170
Ross1s article included the photograph taken at Cuatla of 
the dead body of Emiliano Zapata. The caption placed Zapata 
within the tradition of revolutionary "heroes." The caption 
read, "Reminiscent of the death photographs of Ernesto Che 
Guevara a few years ago . . . The dreams of the hungry could
now remain what they had always been, mere dreams . . .  171 
A year later, Britton Bloom wrote an essay, "The Heirs of 
Zapata," which described social revolutionary movements in 
197 0s Mexico, with particular emphasis on Lucio Cabanas and 
the 2 3rd of September Communist League. Bloom, too, 
emphasized the fact that miserable economic conditions 
promoted the rise of leaders like Zapata and Cabanas. The 
modern Mexican revolutionaries "have served notice" that the 
government must help "a great part of the population —  the 
poor, the illiterate, the isolated country farmer . . ,"172
Bloom unsparingly assessed the chances for success of 
the new Mexican revolutionaries as slim, and did not 
"glamorize" their violent methods. He also, however, 
recognized that a certain amount of myth had grown up around 
Zapata, myth that he used to strengthen the idea of Zapata
170 Steve Ross, "Zapata and the Revolt of the Morelos 
"Indians,1" Mankind, June 1975, 29.
171 Ibid., 37.
172 • • *Britton Bloom, "Heirs of Zapata," Progressive, March 
1976, 33.
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as the forefather of late twentieth century revolutionaries. 
He wrote:
The romantic image of a mustachioed Pancho Villa or 
Zapata suddenly riding into a Mexican village, 
banderoles <sic> flying, to "arrest" a corrupt official 
and return stolen money to the peasants is far enough 
removed in time to be heroic now.173
In 1977, photographer Tom Nebbia presented this
explicitly "created" Zapata to a wide U.S. audience. He
went to Cuatla for the National Geographic and photographed
a group of Zapatista veterans. He paid each Zapatista ten
dollars, had white campesino clothing made for them in the
marketplace, rented hats and bandoleers from a Mexico City
movie studio, borrowed rifles from the Cuatla police
station, and then posed the men as in an early 1900s
photograph.174
From this point on, the myth took over the
presentations of Zapata. Disillusionment with the harshness
and repression of revolutionary movements such as those in
Vietnam and China, created a need for a more "heroic"
guerrilla. In 1979, Peter Newell wrote Zapata of Mexico.
Pulling back from the earlier analyses that stressed
Zapata's fight against the ill effects of capitalism, Newell
attempted to show Zapatismo's anarchist tendencies,
anarchism being a somewhat more "romantic" philosophy.
173 Ibid. , 32.
174 Tom Nebbia to the author, 22 September 1988.
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Unfortunately, while Newell did manage to illustrate some 
libertarian leanings in the decentralized nature of the 
Zapatista movement, his book was severely undermined by 
reliance on Harry Dunn1s "eyewitness'* accounts, indulgence 
in fantastic fictions, and substantial amounts of 
plagiarism. Work on Zapata of this poor quality had not 
been seen, with the exception of Dunn, since 192 0.
CONCLUSION
The presentation of Emiliano Zapata in the United 
States has always been heavily colored by the debate over 
the proper role of the U.S. in Latin America. Until the 
193 0s the major argument was over U.S. exploitation of Latin 
American resources. How far should the government go to 
protect U.S. investments? What was the proper role of the 
native peoples and governments? Were "Americans" abroad to 
carry the white man’s burden as businessmen or teachers? 
Interestingly, portraits of Zapata by those on both sides of 
the issue, with very few exceptions, were negative. To the 
dollar diplomatists and those nostalgic for the Porfiriato, 
the "Attila Del Sur" was a good argument for the need to 
protect vigorously U.S. investments abroad and to 
"discipline" the inferior peoples of Latin America. To the 
liberals Zapata made a good comparison, as a reactionary, to 
show how much the reform administrations of Obregon and 
Calles accomplished.
In the mid-1930s the U.S. underwent a fundamental 
reevaluation of its role in Latin America. As German, 
Italian, and Japanese fascism expanded across Europe,
Africa, and Asia, the Roosevelt administration looked at 
Latin America and saw a long, exposed flank. The government
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had to find symbols to promote inter-American unity. 
Improving relations with Mexico and a new artistic and 
philosophical appreciation for the "primitive" brought on by 
Depression-induced doubts about the blessings of progress 
made the U.S. public ready to welcome a rehabilitation of 
Zapata as one of those symbols. Journalists, authors, and 
the U.S. government enlisted Zapata in the war on fascism.
Zapata, however, was no more a democrat than he was a 
bandit. After the 1952 movie Viva Zapata!, the credibility 
of Zapata as a U.S.-style democratic freedom fighter was 
stretched beyond repair. The Cold War enemy was communism, 
rather than fascism, but the government perception of Latin 
America as a long unguarded flank exposed to a dangerous 
foreign ideology remained. John Steinbeck wholeheartedly 
allowed his original conception of a movie exploring the 
value of violent social revolutions to be drafted into 
service in the war on communism. The resulting film only 
proved how poorly suited Zapata was as a banner figure for 
this point of view. Zapata simply did not fight for 
democracy in the sense that a 1950s U.S. citizen defined the 
word.
Over the next decade, vocal opposition rose to the view 
that the U.S. had a duty to protect the world, especially 
the developing world, from "communist-inspired" violent 
social revolutions. U.S. liberals studied the history and 
leaders of people's revolutions in an attempt to justify
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support for them. After over ten years of silence, Zapata 
was rediscovered in the late 19 60s and recreated as the 
patriarch of twentieth century revolutionaries. This new 
image, of course, required some editing of the Zapata story, 
just as earlier reincarnations had. Zapata made a fairly 
effective revolutionary role model except for the fact that 
he did not lead a national revolution. The current rebels, 
men like Mao and Castro, were nationalists. By the end of 
the 1970s many were disillusioned with violent revolutionary 
movements. Repression and setbacks in Cuba, the Soviet 
Union, and the Cultural Revolution in China cooled a lot of 
enthusiasm. A search for a more romantic Zapata began, but 
never really caught on with the U.S. public.
What is the future of Emiliano Zapata in the U.S.? As 
long as the perception of Latin America as susceptible to 
the "Red Menace" and in need of U.S. guidance and protection 
remains, Zapata has probably run the course of his 
usefulness as a symbolic figure in the United States. He 
has proved ultimately unadaptable to the purposes of both 
the Right and the Left in their debate over the proper role 
of the U.S. in Latin America. And given the history of his 
career, fighting uncompromisingly for his own goals of 
Tierra y Libertad, it should really come as no surprise.
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